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This Article discusses
discusses the Erdemovic case in order
order to
examine whether
against
whether duress
duress should be a defense to a crime against
humanity. Although the Article contends
contends that
humanity.
that the arguments
arguments in
in
favor
claim duress
duress weaken as the
the
favor of permitting
permitting the defendant
defendant to claim
seriousness of the offense charged
seriousness
increases, the Article also
charged increases,
also
argues that
that the duress
argues
duress defense should usually succeed if
if it can
be proved
proved that
that the actor
actor could not have prevented the threatened
threatened
harm by
capitulate to the coercion.
harm
by refusing
refusing to capitulate
coercion.
balancing the competing considerations,
considerations, the Author
After balancing
concludes that
that the defendant
should have been
concludes
defendant in Erdemovic should
been
able to claim
claim duress
duress as
as a defense to the killing of dozens of
able
of
civilians. Because
Because the civilians
civilians would have died
died anyway at the
civilians.
hands of other soldiers,
threats would have been
hands
soldiers, resisting
resisting the threats
been
useless. Even though this fact does not negate
negate the wrongfulness
useless.
defendant's act (i.e., justify
exempt
of the defendant's
justify his conduct),
conduct), it should exempt
liability).
him from responsibility
responsibility (i.e., excuse his liability).
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I. A CASE THAT PROBES
THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS
1.
PROBES THE THEORETICAL
UNDERPINNINGS OF THE
THE
DEFENSE OF DURESS: PROSECUTOR
PROSECUTOR V. DRAZEN ERDEMOvIC
ERDEMOVIC

Prosecutor
Erdemovic1 presents
presents a particularly
particularly difficult case for
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic
the defense of duress. In Erdemovic,
Erdemovic, the International
International Criminal
Criminal
Drazen
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) tried the soldier Drazen
Erdemovic
Erdemovic for crimes
crimes against humanity. He was charged
charged with
systematically
systematically killing Muslim
Muslim men and children in July 1995 as a

1.
Prosecutor
Judgment on Appeal,
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic,
Erdemovi6, Case No. IT·96·22·A,
IT-96-22-A, Judgment
(Oct. 7,
7, 1997).
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member
member of the Bosnian Serb army.
army.22 Initially, he refused to take part
part
in the shootings, but his superiors threatened
threatened to kill him if he did not
comply.
comply.33 At trial, Erdemovic confessed that he succumbed to the
threats and killed nearly seventy people. 4 Ultimately, the question
before the ICTY Appeals Chamber was whether the defense of duress
humanity. 55
against humanity.
charged is a crime against
is available when
when the offense charged
After
of
Mter struggling to come to grips with the problem, a majority of
the justices in the ICTY concluded
concluded that, according to customary
international
international law, duress is not a defense
defense to murder.
murder.66 In contrast, the
dissenters believed
believed that duress could, in principle,
principle, exclude
responsibility for the killing of innocent
innocent human beings; however, they
responsibility
concluded that the defense
concluded
defense of duress is subject
subject to strict
strict
proportionality requirements.
proportionality
requirements.77
Thus, the dissenters
dissenters ultimately
concluded that, in light of the grave harm caused when crimes
against humanity are committed, it would be nearly impossible to
to
effected and
establish the requisite proportionality
proportionality between
between the harm effected
8
the harm averted. 8
momentous
The question before
before the ICTY in Erdemovic
Erdemouic was a momentous
defense to a crime
one. Determining whether duress should be a defense
against humanity
humanity requires
requires delving deeply
deeply into the distinction
distinction
between
between justification
justification and excuse
excuse in order to address three
foundational
foundational problems
problems that cut straight
straight to the heart of criminal law
theory:
common
theory: (1) Is duress a justification
justification or an excuse? (2) Is the common
law rule disallowing duress as a defense to murder sound? (3) Is it
it
proper
of
proper to condition the availability of the defense
defense on the existence of
strict proportionality
proportionality between the harm caused
caused by the defendant's
defendant's
averted? 9
actions and the harm averted?9
Unfortunately, the justices who took part in the Erdemovic
Erdemouic case
1o They
did not adequately
adequately address these fundamental queries.
queries. 10
assumed
assumed that the defense raised was a justification,
justification, even though a
plausible
made in favor of classifying
classifying it as
plausible argument could have been made
an excuse.
excuse."l l Therefore,
whether
Therefore, the justices
justices failed to examine whether
Erdemovic
Erdemovic was claiming
claiming that his wrongful act should be excused

Id.
2.
[d. ~11.
1.
3.
Id. ~18.
[d.
8.
Id.
4.
[d.
Id. ~118.
5.
[d.
18.
6.
Id. ~119.
[d.
19.
Prosecutor
Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting
7.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic,
Opinion of Judge Cassese, ~T 41 (Oct. 7, 1997).
8.
Id. ~ 50.
[d.
9.
See generally
Dressier, Exegesis
Exegesis of the Law of Duress:
generally Joshua Dressler,
Duress: Justifying
Justifying the
Excuse and
and Searching
Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV.
REV. 1331 (1989) (discussing
Searching for
for its Proper
Proper Limits,
the importance of the justification versus excuse distinction).
10.
See Prosecutor
Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-A,
IT-96-22-A, Judgment
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic,
Judgment on Appeal,
11 17-21
17-21 (Oct. 7,
~~
7, 1997).
Id.
11.
[d.
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because he was coerced, rather
rather than that his act was justified because
because
he did the right thing by choosing the lesser evil. The fact that they
particularly surprising
surprising in light of many, if not most,
ignored this is particularly
scholars' belief that the defense
defense of duress is an excuse
excuse and not a
12
justification.
justification. 12
Complicating the matter
matter is the fact that, even if one were to
to
conclude that duress functions as an excuse, it
it is not evident
conclude
evident that itit
should be a defense to every crime. Some have
have suggested that duress
13 Furthermore, even if one
should not be a defense
defense to murder. 13
believes that duress should be a defense
defense to murder, one could still
argue that duress
commission of a crime
duress should not excuse
excuse the commission
crime
murders. 14
of many
against humanity that involves
involves the commission of
many murders.14
ascertain whether
To ascertain
whether it
it is correct
correct to excuse those who commit murder
murder
or crimes
crimes against humanity because
because they were coerced, it is necessary
those who perform
to examine the rationale that justifies excusing those
of
wrongful acts. Even though some have tackled the question of
legal
whether the rationale for excusing actors should compel
compel the legal
community to accept
similar
community
accept duress as a defense to murder, a similar
15
against humanity.
analysis is wanting
wanting in the context of crimes
crimes against
humanity.15
Finally, it is unclear
to
unclear whether a defendant
defendant should be able to
successfully
plead
duress
when
the
harm
caused
was
of
epic
successfully
harm
proportions.
It may very
very well be that, under certain
certain extreme
circumstances, society could legitimately
legitimately require the coerced actor to
to
do everything
everything in her power, even sacrifice her own life, to avert the
grave harm that would
succumbed to the threat.
would be inflicted
inflicted if she succumbed
Therefore, it makes sense
to
ask
whether
a
defendant
sense
defendant like Erdemovic
Erdemovic

See, e.g., Dressler,
Dressier, supra
supra note 9; see also
also MARKUS
12.
MARKUS DUBBER,
DUBBER, CRIMINAL
CRIMINAL LAW:
LAw:
MODEL PENAL
PENAL CODE 251 (2002) (describing duress as "the excuse
excuse analogue
analogue to the
justification
Duress is Not a Justification,
justification of necessity");
necessity"); Kyron Huigens, Duress
Justification, 2 OHIO ST. J.
J.
CRIM. L. 303 (2004) (discussing duress
duress as an excuse). The drafters of the Model Penal
Penal
Code also believed that duress was an excuse and
and not a justification.
justification. See MODEL
PENAL CODE
CODE AND COMMENTARIES
COMMENTARIES §§ 2.09
2.09 cmt. 2 (1985).
The problem
problem of § 2.09 [duress],
[duress], then, reduces to the question of whether there
are cases where
[choice of
where the actor cannot
cannot justify his conduct
conduct under § 3.02 [choice
of
evils], as when his choice involves
involves an equal or greater
greater evil than that
that
threatened,
threatened, but where he nonetheless
nonetheless should be excused because
because he was
subjected to coercion.
13.
See, e.g., JEROME
JEROME HALL, GENERAL
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL
CRIMINAL LAW
LAw 448 (2d ed.
have also held that duress is not a defense to grave crimes such
such
1960). Several courts have
as murder. See State v. St. Clair, 262 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Mo. 1953); Nall v. Commonwealth,
Commonwealth,
271 S.w.
S.W. 1059
1059 (Ky. 1925).
It should be noted that crimes against humanity include acts other than
It
14.
murder, such as rape, enslavement, torture, etc. For a discussion of the different
different
modes of commission
CASSESE,
ANTONIO CASSESE,
commission of crimes against humanity, see ANTONIO
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw
LAW 74-81 (2003). The defendant
Erdemovic, however,
INTERNATIONAL
defendant in Erdemovic,
committed the offense
perpetration of multiple
was charged with having committed
offense by way
way of the perpetration
multiple
murders.
15.
See Dressler, supra
supra note 9, at 1367-74.
HeinOnline -- 41 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 744 2008
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should be held responsible
responsible in view of the fact that the harm he
inflicted
inflicted (the deaths of dozens of people) is significantly graver than
16
the one he averted (the loss of his own life).
A satisfactory answer
answer
life).16
proportionality
to this question requires an elucidation of the role of proportionality
in the context
context of excuse defenses.
This Article will examine these three problems in four parts.
of
Part II probes the opinions in the Erdemovic case
case with the purpose of
demonstrating that both the majority
majority and the dissent treated
treated the
duress defense as if it were
were a claim of justification. Part III argues
argues
that their conclusion was injudicious and that, properly
properly understood,
duress
duress is an excuse, not a justification. Part III also argues that, in
light of the nature of the defense, it is unwise to disallow claims of
of
duress
duress when the offense
offense charged
charged is murder.
Part IV attempts
of
attempts to show that the arguments in favor of
permitting
defendant to claim
seriousness
permitting the defendant
claim duress weaken as the seriousness
of the offense
offense increases.
increases. This contention, which this Article calls the
"seriousness
of the
offense" thesis,
"seriousness of
the offense"
thesis, provides
provides intuitive support for
for
distinguishing
distinguishing cases in which the defendant
defendant pleads duress
duress to a crime
involving the killing of one human
human being from those in which the
involving
actor
actor claims
claims duress as a defense to the killing of dozens or hundreds
hundreds
of persons. While human sensibilities seem to point toward allowing
not
the defense
defense in cases of the former type, these intuitions
intuitions do not
support
support permitting the claim
claim in situations of the latter type.
theoretical support
This Article finds theoretical
support for the intuitions upon
which
which the seriousness of the offense
offense thesis is grounded in what the
Author terms the "understandable
"understandable choice" theory of duress.
According to this theory, a coerced
coerced actor
actor is properly
properly excused
excused when
when her
her
decision to engage in wrongful conduct finds sufficient
sufficient understanding
understanding
amongst the community
community to warrant
warrant an exemption from liability. The
latter portion of Part
Part IV points out two factors that should be taken
aforementioned determination,
into account
account when making the aforementioned
namely: (1) whether
whether the defendant
defendant had a legal duty to resist the
threats he faced, even if refusing
refusing to succumb would lead to the
defendant's death; and (2) whether the actor could have prevented
defendant's
prevented
harm to the victims by refusing to capitulate
capitulate to the coercion.
Finally, Part V applies the understandable
understandable choice theory of
duress to the facts in the Erdemovic
Erdemovic case. After balancing
balancing the
competing considerations,
defendant should
considerations, Part V concludes
concludes that the defendant
have been able to claim duress as a defense
defense to the killing of dozens
dozens of
of
civilians. Because
Because the civilians
civilians would have died anyway at the hands
of other soldiers, resisting the threats
threats would have been
been useless. Even
Even
though this fact does not negate the wrongfulness
wrongfulness of the defendant's
defendant's

~

16.
See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT·96·22·A,
IT-96-22-A, Judgment
Judgment on Appeal,
3 (Oct. 7, 1997) (setting forth the facts of the case).
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act (i.e., justify the conduct),
conduct), it should exempt Erdemovic and those
responsibility (i.e., excuse
like him from responsibility
excuse the defendant from liability).

II. CHRONICLES OF A
FORETOLD: THE OPINIONS IN THE
A CONFUSION
CONFUSION FORETOLD:
THE
17

CASE l7
ERDEMOVIC CASE

A. The Majority
Majority Opinion:
Opinion: Duress
Duress as a Justification
Justification
Three of the five ICTY
that
ICTY justices who decided Erdemovic
Erdemovic ruled that
188
duress is not a defense
to
murder
or
to
crimes
against
humanity.
defense
humanity.1 In
In
doing so, they adopted the common
common law rule that duress is not a
defense
beings. 19 After examining
defense to the killing of innocent
innocent human beings.19
the writings of common
common law scholars such as Blackstone and Stephen,
"[i]f national law denies recognition
recognition of duress as
they concluded that "[i]f
a defence in respect
respect of the killing of innocent
innocent persons, international
international
criminal law can do no less than match
match that
policy
since
it deals with
magnitude. 2 0
murders
murders often of far greater
greater magnitude."2o
conclusion was greatly influenced by Hale's famous
This conclusion
assertion
of
assertion that "if a man be desperately assaulted, and in peril of
death, and cannot
cannot otherwise escape, unless to satisfy his assailant's
fury he will kill an innocent person then present, the fear and actual
force will not acquit him of the crime
crime and punishment
punishment of murder, if he
commit the fact for he ought rather to die himself, than kill an
innocent. '2 1 Underlying
innocent."21
Underlying the position adopted by the majority is the
maxim that it can never be right to kill an innocent
innocent human being
contrary rule would violate
because the contrary
violate the "special sanctity
sanctity that the
life."2 2 Consequently, no one should have a
law attaches to human life."22

For a more detailed
Erdemovic case,
17.
detailed account
account of the different
different opinions in the Erdemovic
case,
see Ramon
Ram6n I. Ragu6s,
Debe el Miedo Insuperable
de
Ragues, Debe
Insuperable Exculpar
Exculpar a un Soldado
Soldado Acusado de
Crimenes
Lesa Humanidad?,
CRIMINOLOGIA 95
Crimenes de Lesa
Humanidad?, 7 REVISTA
REVISTA DE DERECHO PENAL Y CRIMINOLOGiA
(2001).
Prosecutor
IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate
Separate Opinion of
18.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case
Case No. IT·96·22·A,
1997); Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT·96·
IT-96Judges McDonald
McDonald and Vohrah (Oct. 7,
7, 1997);
22-A,
22·A, Separate
Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Judge Li (Oct. 7, 1997).
See generally
v. Erdemovic,
IT-96-22-A, Judgment on
on
19.
generally Prosecutor
Prosecutor v.
Erdemovic, Case No. IT·96·22·A,
Appeal (Oct. 7, 1997).
Prosecutor
IT-96-22.A, Joint Separate
Separate Opinion of
Erdemovic, Case
Case No. IT-96·22·A,
20.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic,
Judges McDonald and Vohrah, '1/ 75 (Oct. 7, 1997);
1997); see also
also Prosecutor
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic,
Case No. IT·96·22·A,
IT-96-22-A, Separate
Separate and Dissenting
12 (Oct. 7, 1997)
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Li, '1/12
1997)
agreement with Judges McDonald
McDonald and Vohrah's views regarding the
(expressing his agreement
applicability
defense to the case
applicability of the duress
duress defense
case at bar).
Prosecutor
IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate
Separate Opinion of
21.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic,
Erdemovic, Case
Case No. IT-96·22·A,
Judges McDonald and Vohrah, '1/ 71 (Oct. 7, 1997) (citing 1 SIR MATTHEW
MATTHEW HALE, THE
HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 51 (1800».
(1800)).
HISTORY
IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate
Separate Opinion of
Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96·22·A,
of
22.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic,
McDonald and Vohrah, '1/ 71 (Oct. 7, 1997) (quoting R. v. Howe, [1987] A.C. 417,
Judges McDonald
439 (H.L.) (conjoined appeals) (U.K.)).
(U.K.».
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legal right to
to choose
choose that
that one innocent
innocent person
person be killed
killed instead
instead of
of
legal
23
another.23
another.
24
these
As this Author
Author has discussed
discussed at
at length
length elsewhere,
elsewhere,24
these are
are the
same considerations
considerations that underpin
underpin the common
common law
law rule
rule that
that one
same
cannot justify
justify the killing
killing of
of an
an innocent
innocent person
person by
by way
way of the
cannot
25 However,
necessity
necessity or choice
choice of
of evils
evils defense.
defense.25
However, one
one important
important
difference between
between the common
common law rules
rules that "necessity is not a
difference
defense
defense to a crime
crime involving
involving
defense to murder" and "duress isis not a defense
is
the death
death of
of an innocent
innocent human
human being"
being" is that
that necessity
necessity
is a
26
whereas duress
duress is
is usually
usually considered
considered an
an excuse.
excuse. 26
justification, whereas
justification,
The
The importance
importance of the aforesaid
aforesaid fact should
should not be understated.
understated.
Justifications negate
Justifications
negate the
the wrongfulness
wrongfulness of
of the
the act, while
while excuses
excuses
culpability without
without eliminating
eliminating the
merely exclude
exclude the actor's culpability
merely
27 Therefore,
wrongful nature
nature of
of the conduct. 27
Therefore, when
when an actor
actor claims
claims to
to
wrongful
asserting that he has
has a right
right to engage
engage in
in the
the prima
prima
be justified, he is asserting
28
facie prohibited
prohibited conduct.
conduct. 28
if Joe
For
For example, if
Joe alleges
alleges that he
he justifiably
justifiably killed
killed Mary in
in selfdefense, he is claiming
claiming that he had aa right
right to avert Mary's wrongful
wrongful
even if that involved violating
violating the prima
prima facie prohibition
prohibition
attack, even
against killing people. However,
However, when
when an actor
actor claims
claims to be excused,
excused,
against
in the
he is not asserting
asserting aa right to engage
engage in
the prima
prima facie
facie wrongful
wrongful
contend that they should be
Excused actors merely
merely contend
be
conduct.2299 Excused
act
exculpated
exculpated because
because they did not perform the admittedly
admittedly wrongful
wrongful act

23.
24.

Id.
Criminal Law: A Reasons
Gaps in the Criminal
See Luis E. Chiesa, Normative
Normative Gaps
considerations
Wrongdoing, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 102 (2007) (discussing
(discussing considerations
Theory of Wrongdoing,
that underpin
underpin the common law rule
rule that one cannot justify
justify the killing of an innocent
innocent
of the necessity
person by way ofthe
necessity or choice of evils
evils defense).
& Stephens, (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 273.
See, e.g., R. v. Dudley &
25.
supra note 12, at 251
also DUBBER, supra
supra note 9; see also
See, e.g., Dressler, supra
26.
251
(discussing duress and necessity); Huigens, supra
supra note 12 (same).
supra note 12, at 251
also DUBBER,
Dressier, supra
supra note 9; see also
See, e.g., Dressler,
27.
DUBBER, supra
251
necessity); Huigens, supra
(discussing duress and necessity);
supra note 12
12 (same).
For a cogent defense of the idea
idea that justifications
justifications confer
confer rights to infringe
28.
EUGENIO RAUL ZAFFARONI, DERECHO PENAL
PENAL PARTE
on a prohibitory norm, see EUGENIO
attaches when the prohibitory
GENERAL 590 (2d ed. 2002) (stating that justification attaches
GENERAL
are
it is recognized that justified actors are
"qualified" in such a manner
norm is "qualified"
manner that it
"exercising aa right"
right" to
to engage
engage in
facie wrongful
wrongful action).
action). Fletcher prefers to say
say
"exercising
in aa prima
prima facie
GEORGE P.
"privileges" to infringe on the prohibitory norm. GEORGE
that justifications
justifications confer "privileges"
562-66 (2000). This Author does not think
LAW 562-66
FLETCHER, RETHINKING
RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw
there is an important difference
difference between Fletcher's
Fletcher's description of justifications
justifications as the
of
exercise of privileges
exercise
privileges and the Author's definition of justifications
justifications as the exercise of
statement that "justifications generate prima facie rights" in
rights. See Fletcher's statement
and the Reasonable,
Right and
George P. Fletcher, The Right
Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 978 (1985).
Approach to
Comparative Law Approach
Do Us Part:
B. Sharon Byrd, Till Death
Death Do
Part: A Comparative
29.
INVL L. 169, 170
COMP. &
& INTL
Battered Women, 1 DUKE J.
Lethal Self-Defense by Battered
Justifying
Justifying Lethal
J. COMPo
n.9 (1991) (asserting that justifications confer a right to engage in the prima facie
not).
prohibited
prohibited conduct, whereas excuses do not).
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30 Thus, if Joe alleges that he killed Mary
in a blameworthy
blameworthy manner. 30
while he was insane, he is not claiming
claiming that he had a right to harm
Mary. Rather, he seeks to be exonerated
exonerated because he did not kill Mary
blameworthy manner, as he was insane
in a blameworthy
insane when he committed the
31
offense. 31
Therefore,
Therefore, the question that the majority of the justices
justices in
Erdemovic asked-whether
asked-whether the coerced
defendant had a right
right to kill
coerced defendant
innocent civilians-was only relevant if the defendant alleged that he
was justified
justified in committing the offense.3322 However,
However, if the defendant's
defendant's
claim
claim was merely that he should have been excused
excused for wrongfully
inquiring whether he had a privilege or a
killing innocent civilians, inquiring
3
Evidence of coercion
coercion
right to commit murder
murder is entirely
entirely irrelevant.333
Evidence
establishing whether he should be excused from
would be pertinent to establishing
demonstrating that his
blame for killing innocent civilians but not for demonstrating
actions were
were justified.
Because
of
defense as one of
Because the justices conceived of the defense
justification,
followed- the common
concluded that
common law and concluded
that
justification, they then followed·
Erdemovic
against
Erdemovic could not plead
plead duress as a defense to a crime
crime against
humanity. 34 They did not consider
humanity.34
consider that his claim might have
have been
been
35
examined as one of excuse. 35
As subsequent
subsequent Parts of this Article will
demonstrate, treating
treating duress as a defense of excuse
excuse might have
changed the outcome of the case.
B. Judge
Cassese's Dissenting
DissentingOpinion:
Opinion:Duress
as a Halfway House
Judge Cassese's
Duress as
House
and Excuse
between Justification
Justification and
Judge
Judge Cassese, dissenting in the Erdemovic
Erdemovic decision, criticized
criticized
the majority's approach to the question
question of whether duress should be a

Owen S. Walker, Why Should Irresponsible
Excused?, 46 J.
30.
Irresponsible Offenders be Excused?,
J.
PHIL. 279, 279 (1969) (stating that excuses render violators of norms blameless); see
also Sanford
Excusing Crime,
also
Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing
Crime, 75 CAL. L. REV.
REV. 257, 261
261 (1987)
(1987) (asserting
that excuses deny blame for a harm done).
31.
The Author chose to illustrate
illustrate the nature of excuses by way of the insanity
defense because
because there is some debate regarding whether other
other claims, such as selfHowever, there is no
no
justifications or excuses.
defense or duress, constitute justifications
Ferzan
controversy about the fact that insanity
insanity is an excuse. Thus, as Professor Kim Ferzan
has stated, insanity is the "classic instance" of an excuse.
excuse. Kimberly Kessler
Kessler Ferzan,
Defending Imminence: From
Iraq, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 213, 218 (2004).
From Battered
Battered Women to Iraq,
Prosecutor
32.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgment
Judgment on Appeal (Oct. 7,
1997).
Continental
Continental scholars agree
agree with this criticism
criticism of the Erdemovic
Erdemovic case. See,
33.
Raguds, supra
17, at 130 (stating that "when the majority
in
e.g., Ragues,
supra note 17,
majority [of the judges in
the case]
justification with claims of excuse
... they are turning their
case) conflate claims of justification
excuse ...
their
back on the real core of the debate.").
Prosecutor
34.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case
Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgment
Judgment on Appeal, ~ 5
1997).
(Oct. 7, 1997).
35.
35.
Id.
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36
He.particularly
disapproved
defense to a crime against humanity.
humanity.36
He.particularly disapproved
of the conclusion
conclusion that the common law
law rule against raising duress as
a defense to a crime involving
involving the death of innocent persons should be
be
37
international arena. 37
adopted in the international
His argument
argument can be
summarized as follows:
summarized

(1) Under international
international law, the general
general rule is that duress can be
requirements are
pleaded as a defense as long as several
several stringent
stringent requirements
38
met;38
met;
(2) No customary
customary rule of international law has crystallized
crystallized regarding
whether duress can
can be raised
raised in a case
case involving war crimes
crimes or
or
39
humanity;
crimes against
against humanity;39
crimes
(3) In the absence
absence of a specific rule of international
international criminal law
governing the subject, the general rule regarding duress should
apply in cases of crimes
crimes against
against humanity. Therefore, a claim of
of
duress can
can be raised in these cases as long as the strict
requirements
availability of the defense under
under
requirements that condition the availability
40
are met.
traditional
traditional international
international law
law are
met. 40

Judge Cassese
on
Cassese thoroughly examined
examined the applicable
applicable case law on
the subject and concluded
concluded that the evidence
evidence in favor of an exception to
the general
general rule that duress can be pleaded as a defense to any crime
was scarce
scarce and, in any case, inconclusive.
inconclusive. 4411 Additionally, he cited
cited
several Italian and German
German cases
cases that provided support to his claim
that duress could be raised as a defense
defense to a crime involving the
42
beings.
human
innocent
of
murder
murder
beings.42
However, Judge Cassese concluded
concluded that duress could only be a
defense
defense to the killing of innocent civilians if the harm caused was less
than the one averted. 4433 By inserting
inserting this strict proportionality
proportionality
requirement, he infelicitously attached
attached a justificatory
justificatory constraint to

Prosecutor
36.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting
Dissenting
Opinion
Opinion of Judge Cassese (Oct. 7, 1997).
37.
Id.
[d. ~ 11.
Id.
38.
[d.
Id.
39.
[d.
40.
Id.
[d.
41.
Id.
41.
[d. ~ 44.
42.
Id.
Bernardi and Randazzo,
Randazzo, a decision of the Italian
42.
[d. ~~ 35-36 (discussing Bernardi
Court of Cassation of July 14, 1947 (handwritten text on file with International
International
Criminal
Cass. Crim. 1947,
Criminal Tribunal));
Tribunal»; Cass., sez. pen.,
pen., 6 Nov. 1947, n.2557, Giur. It.
It. Casso
1947,
414; Landgericht
Landgericht [LG]
NS-Verbrechen 521
[LG] [Trial Court] May 21,
21, 1948, 22 Justiz und NS-Verbrechen
(F.R.G.)).
(F.R.G.».
43.
It
It is not clear whether necessity can be
be claimed
claimed as a justification
justification to the
that
killing of innocent people.
people. Judge
Judge Cassese's
Cassese's opinion
opinion could be read in a way that
It should be pointed out, however,
supports an affirmative
affirmative answer
answer to this question. It
that the common
common law rule seems
seems to be that the necessity defense cannot justify the
See, e.g., R v. Dudley & Stephens, (1884)
taking of innocent
innocent life.
See,
(1884) 14 Q.B.D. 273.
However, the drafters
be
drafters of the Model Penal
Penal Code suggest that the actor should
should be
justified
justified if he saves more lives than the ones that he sacrifices. See MODEL
MODEL PENAL
CODE
COMMENTARIES § 3.02 cmt. 3 (1985).
of
CODE AND
AND COMMENTARIES
(1985). For a more detailed examination
examination of
these issues, see Chiesa, supra
supra note 24.
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the
the defense
defense of
of duress.
duress. Judge
Judge Cassese's
Cassese's solution
solution elides
elides the difference
difference
consequently,
defenses
and,
and
duress
between
between choice
choice of evils
evils
duress defenses
consequently,
Because
between
between justifications
justifications and excuses.
excuses.
Because necessity
necessity is aa
justification,
seems proper
proper to limit the scope
scope of
of the
the defense
defense by
by
justification, itit seems
than
the
harm
be
greater
harm
averted
requiring
requiring that
that the
the harm averted be greater than the harm caused.
Only
then should
should the conduct
conduct not be
be regarded
regarded wrongful.
wrongful.
Only then
However,
Erdemovic was
was claiming
claiming that his admittedly
However, if Erdemovic
wrongful
wrongful act
act should
should be excused
excused because
because of duress, it would
would not
not make
much
much sense to subject
subject his
his claim
claim to stringent
stringent proportionality
proportionality
44 By definition,
requirements.44
definition, excused
excused conduct
conduct is wrongful
wrongful conduct.
requirements.
Consequently,
the excused
excused actor
actor is acquitted
acquitted is because
because
Consequently, the reason the
the
the circumstances
circumstances of the offense
offense indicate
indicate that
that it
it would
would be
be unfair
unfair to
to
45 Whether
blame her
her for committing
committing the
the wrongful
wrongful act. 45
Whether or
or not
not the
blame
excused
excused actor's conduct
conduct was the lesser
lesser of two evils is, in principle,
principle,
irrelevant.
irrelevant. Therefore, as
as Professor
Professor Paul Robinson
Robinson has
has correctly
correctly
of excuse
excuse defenses
defenses by conditioning
conditioning
pointed out, limiting the scope of
pointed
their availability
availability upon the existence
existence of
of strict
strict proportion
proportion between
between the
harm caused and the harm averted would
would
[erroneously] impl[y]
impl[y] that the actor
actor must avoid a greater
greater harm to
to
[erroneously]
requirement undermines the
receive an [excuse] defense. Such a requirement
defenses]. As [the previous
rationale
rationale for [excuse
[excuse defenses].
previous discussion]
discussion] illustrates,
illustrates,
encourage conduct
justifications
justifications encourage
conduct that creates
creates a net benefit, while
cause a net
net harm but who are
excuses exculpate
exculpate actors who cause
46
blameless.
blameless. 46

defendant in Erdemovic
As a result
result of this, if the
the defendant
Erdemouic was
was alleging
that it would be unfair to punish him for his wrongful
wrongful act because
because he
he
was coerced
coerced into killing innocent
innocent persons, his claim was one of excuse
excuse
decision
justification. If this was the case, Judge
Judge Cassese's decision
and not of justification.
to limit the availability
availability of the duress
duress defense to instances where the
actor
actor chose
chose the lesser evil is cast
cast into doubt.
Unfortunately,
Unfortunately, the drafters
drafters of the Rome Statute of the
seemed to follow Cassese's position
International
International Criminal Court seemed
position
47
regarding
regarding duress. 47
Hence, according to the Rome Statute, duress is a
if, "the person does not intend to cause a greater
defense
greater
defense if, and only if,
avoided. '48 This provision
harm than the one sought to be avoided."48
provision blurs the
distinction
distinction between justification
justification and excuse
excuse under international

The Author does not mean to imply that proportionality
44.
proportionality never plays a role
It might be coherently argued
determining whether an actor should be excused. It
when determining
great deal
engage in an act that causes a great
that someone under duress should refuse to engage
proportionality requirement that
more harm than the harm avoided. However, the proportionality
could attach in the context of claims of excuse
excuse is much more lax than the one that is
traditionally
traditionally employed
employed in the context of justifications.
supra note 44.
45.
See supra
ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW
LAw DEFENSES
DEFENSES 367-68 (1984).
46.
2 PAUL H. ROBINSON,
17, 1998,
1998, 37
47.
Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 31(d), July 17,
I.L.M. 999.
I.L.M.999.
48.
Id.
HeinOnline -- 41 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 750 2008

20081
2008J

DURESS, DEMANDING
DEMANDING HEROISM,
HEROISM, AND PROPORTIONALITY
PROPORTIONALITY
DURESS,

751
751

criminal law
law because
because it
it conditions
conditions the availability
availability of
of the
the defense
defense upon
upon
criminal
requirement characteristic of justifications,
justifications, even
aa proportionality requirement
49
though duress
duress is
is considered
considered by
by many to
to be
be an
an excuse. 49
Surprisingly,
though
Surprisingly,
international
law
scholars
have
uncritically
accepted
the Rome
Rome
international
have
accepted the
50
Statute's
take
on
the
subject.
Gerhard
Werle,
for
example,
recently
Statute's
on the subject.50 Gerhard Werle,
example, recently
stated that duress
duress can
can only
only be pleaded
pleaded as
as aa defense when
when the crime
stated
evils.' ' 51
two evils."51
of two
lesser of
the lesser
"on balance, the
committed is "on
If the international legal
legal community adopts
adopts Justice Cassese's
If
and
the
Rome
Statute's
position
that
duress
be conceived of
of as
and
Rome Statute's
duress should be
a
variation
of
the
justificatory
is only available
a
necessity defense that is
when the actor chooses the lesser of two evils, then
then it seems
seems clear that
when
duress would seldom, if ever, be a defense to aa crime against
against
humanity involving the commission of multiple murders. The evil of
of
killing many civilians will always be equal to or greater than the evil
52
of killing the coerced actor. 52
Consequently, it
it would be nearly
impossible
for
defendants
like
Erdemovic
impossible
Erdemovic to prove that they chose the
lesser evil when they committed
committed the crime. However, if duress were
considered
an
excuse,
there would be no need to restrict
considered
restrict its scope by
requiring
that
the
harm
caused by the actor be strictly proportional
proportional to
to
requiring
53 The most relevant consideration
the one prevented.53
consideration would be
be
whether the actor should be blamed and punished
punished for having
committed the crime while under coercion to do so.
It
precisely this claim-that
claim-that duress is an excuse that should
lt is
is precisely
not be subjected
subjected to stringent
standards-that the next
stringent proportionality
proportionality standards-that
next
Part of this Article defends.

III. THE
AVAILABILITY IN
IN
THE NATURE
NATURE OF
OF THE DURESS
DURESS DEFENSE
DEFENSE AND ITS AVAILABILITY
CASES
CASES OF MURDER

As proposed
proposed in Part
establish whether
As
Part II, in order to establish
whether the duress
duress
defense
functions
as
a
justification
or
as
an
excuse,
one should
defense functions
justification
should ask
whether
whether it
it negates
negates the
the wrongfulness
wrongfulness of
of the
the act
act (and thus
thus is a

49.
See,
49.
See, e.g.,
e.g.,. FLETCHER,
FLETCHER, supra
supra note
note 28,
28, at
at 831-33;
831-33; see
see also Kent Greenawalt,
Greenawalt,
Natural
General Justification
Natural Law
Law and
and Political
Political Choice:
Choice: The General
Justification Defense-Criteria
Defense-Criteria for
for
Political
and the
the Duty
Duty to
to Obey
Obey the Law,
Law, Lecture
Lecture at
at the
the Catholic
Catholic University
University of
of
Political Action
Action and
America
15, 1986),
1986), in
in 36
36 CATH.
CATH. U.
U. L.
L. REV.
REV. 1,
1, 24-25
24-25 (1986)
(1986) (suggesting
(suggesting that
that
America (Apr.
(Apr. 15,
duress,
duress, as
as opposed
opposed to
to the
the lesser-evils
lesser-evils defense,
defense, is an
an excuse,
excuse, not a justification).
justification).
50.
See,
50.
See, e.g.,
e.g., GERHARD
GERHARD WERLE,
WERLE, PRINCIPLES
PRINCIPLES OF
OF INTERNATIONAL
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
CRIMINAL LAW
147
147 (2005).
(2005).
51.
Id.
51.
Id.
52.
It
52.
It might,
might, however,
however, be
be argued
argued that
that the
the evil
evil of
of killing many civilians
civilians is
is less
less
than
than the
the evil
evil of
of killing
killing the
the coerced
coerced actor
actor if
if the
the coerced
coerced actor
actor could
could not
not have
have prevented
prevented
the
the civilians'
civilians' deaths.
53.
It
53.
It should
should be
be noted
noted that
that continental
continental criminal
criminal law
law theorists
theorists also
also believe
believe that
that
an
an actor
actor can
can have
have aa valid
valid duress
duress claim
claim even
even if
if he
he inflicts
inflicts more
more harm
harm than
than the
the one
one
averted.
See, e.g.,
e.g., JUAN
JUAN J.J. BUSTOS
BUSTOS RAMiREZ
RAMiREZ &
& HERNAN
HERNAN HORMAZABAL
HORMAZABAL MALARtE,
MALAREE, IIII
averted. See,
LECCIONES
LECCIONES DE
DE DERECHO
DERECHO PENAL
PENAL 380-87
380-87 (1999).
(1999).
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justification) 54 or the blameworthiness
justification)54
blameworthiness of the actor (and thus is an
55
excuse).
It
is
illustrative
of the point to analyze
case
excuse).55 It
analyze a hypothetical
hypothetical case
ascertain whether the defendant
duress in order
order to ascertain
defendant
of exculpatory
exculpatory duress
should be acquitted
acquitted because
because he made the right choice, or rather
rather
because the defendant
defendant performed
performed a wrongful act in a nonblameworthy manner.
blameworthy
Assume, for example, that Larry
threatened to kill Joe and his
Larry threatened
family if Joe refused
refused to help him rob the First National
National Bank.
Assume also that Larry's threat is real, that he has the capacity
capacity to
cause the threatened harm, and that Joe's only genuine chance of
of
to
avoiding this harm is to help Larry rob the bank. If Joe decides to
help Larry rob the bank in order
order to save himself
himself and his family, he
probably would not be convicted robbery because
because he acted under
under
duress. Although it seems intuitive
intuitive that Joe should be exonerated,
the reason
reason is not entirely
entirely clear. Is it that, under the circumstances,
circumstances,
even though
though
robbing the bank was the right thing to do, or that, even
robbing the bank was a wrongful act, it would be unjust to punish
punish Joe
for his wrongdoing?
This Article proposes
proposes that the proper conclusion
conclusion is that Joe
committed an unjustified
unjustified act that should nevertheless
nevertheless be excused.
excused.
Justified acts are acts that ought to be encouraged, or at least
least
tolerated, by society, and robbing a bank to avoid personal harm is
56
A society
not conduct that society should encourage or tolerate. 56
society
might be willing to acquit the coerced bank robber out of compassion
compassion
belief that others should opt to
to
for his circumstances, but not out of a belief
57
rob banks when faced with similar threats. 57
It might also be argued
argued
that the state should not punish its citizens
citizens for failing to resist
resist
threats that most citizens would also have failed to resist. It does not
not
follow, however, that such a failure should escape condemnation.
concession to human
Acquittal in these cases is more the product of a concession
determination that the actor's conduct was,
frailty than of a societal
societal determination
58
on balance, not wrongful. 58
conclude that Joe's
act
Even though there are good reasons to conclude
Joe's act
should not be justified, the same cannot be said about whether
whether it
it
should be excused. Excuses
Excuses express understanding
understanding for the actor who,
circumstances or personal disabilities, cannot be
extreme circumstances
be
because of extreme

supra note 12,
12, at 251.
54.
DUBBER, supra
55.
Id.
56.
and Principles
Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct
Conduct and
Principles of Adjudication,
Adjudication, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 729, 749 (1990).
57.
On the relationship
of
relationship between
between practices of excusing
excusing and sentiments
sentiments of
generally Victoria Nourse, Passion's
Modern Law Reform
compassion, see
see generally
Passion's Progress:
Progress: Modern
and the Provocation
ProvocationDefense,
1331 (1997).
and
Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331
58.
Jeremy
Provocation and
and Duress,
Duress, 1992 CRIM. L. REV.
Jeremy Horder, Autonomy, Provocation
LAW 487 (Russell L. Weaver et al. eds., 1998)
707, in READINGS IN
IN CRIMINAL LAw
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59
Thus,
fairly expected to abstain
abstain from committing
committing the wrongful act. 59
determine if Joe's robbing of the bank should
in order to determine
should be excused,
one must ask whether a reasonable person in his position would also
have elected to commit
commit the crime. Usually, it would be unfair to
to
punish someone
someone for succumbing
succumbing to a threat that a normal
normal law-abiding
law-abiding
citizen would have been
been unable
unable to resist. In Joe's case, it seems quite
citizen
it would be unfair to punish him for deciding to rob the
clear that it
bank in order to avoid harm to himself and his family. Most people
would probably
probably have chosen the same course of action. Consequently,
Consequently,
Joe's wrongful act should
should be excused. His conduct, however, remains
to
wrongful. Society should condemn the acts of those who yield to
threats and inflict significant harm on innocent
innocent persons.
Nonetheless,
Nonetheless, it is sensible
sensible not to punish such actors who were
subjected
coercion that made their decisions to engage
subjected to coercion
engage in the
All in all, their conduct, though
criminal acts understandable.
60
blameworthy.
wrongful, is not blameworthy.6o
If it is true, as this Part has attempted to show by way of this
hypothetical, that duress is an excuse, then it would, as a general
general
rule, be improper to limit its availability to cases where the actor
actor
chose the lesser evil. The reason
reason excused actors are acquitted is that
that
it is not fair to blame them for their actions, not that their actions
were right. Thus, the only pertinent
pertinent inquiry is whether
whether society could
could
have
overcome the coercion
have reasonably required the defendant
defendant to overcome
coercion and
resist the threats. Consequently, whether
whether the harm caused by the
coerced actor was greater than the one averted is, as a general rule,
61
determinative.61
not determinative.
excluding it
If duress is an excuse, the common law blanket
blanket rule excluding
as a defense to murder should be rejected. Granting
Granting an excuse to an
an
actor who kills under
under coercion
coercion is not tantamount
tantamount to recognizing that
that
victim. 6622 In these cases, the harm averted
averted
she had a right to kill her victim.
by the actor was not greater than the one produced and, therefore,
her conduct
conduct is still considered
considered wrongful. However, in most cases,
someone who wrongfully kills an innocent human being while under
someone
under
coercion should not be punished if most members of the society would

59.
Wrongdoing and
and Attribution:
B. Sharon Byrd, Wrongdoing
Attribution: Implications
Implications Beyond the
Justification-Excuse
Justification-Excuse Distinction,
Distinction, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1289, 1290
1290 (1987).
60.
Recently, Peter Westen
argued that duress
Westen and James Mangiafico
Mangiafico argued
duress is better
better
conceived
& James Mangiafico,
Criminal
conceived as a justification.
justification. See Peter Westen &
Mangiafico, The Criminal
Defense of Duress:
Duress: A Justification,
Justification, Not an Excuse-And Why it Matters,
Matters, 6 BUFF. CRIM.
CRIM.
L. REV. 833 (2003). Their
For
Their position, though provocative, is ultimately
ultimately unconvincing. For
a refutation of Westen
Westen and
and Mangiafico's
Mangiafico's arguments, see
see Huigens, supra
supra note 12.
61.
See ROBINSON,
supra note
ROBINSON, supra
note 46, at 368
368 (stating that the concerns
concerns
underpinning
conduct
underpinning the notion that duress
duress should
should only be available when the actor's conduct
avoided
greater harm that the one
avoided a greater
one caused are "misplaced").
Id.
62.
Id. at 368-69.
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63
In these instances, punishing those who
have done the same thing.
thing.63
succumb to the threat and commit murder would typically not be
warranted on either
warranted
either utilitarian
utilitarian or deontological
deontological grounds. From a
stranger in order
utilitarian perspective,
perspective, people who kill a stranger
order to avoid
deterrable by criminal
harm to themselves or their loved ones are not deterrable
sanctions.6644 In contrast, from a deontological
deontological standpoint, punishing
someone who succumbed
someone
succumbed to a threat to which most people
people would have
65
also yielded
yielded is unjust. 65
Hence, as the drafters
drafters of the Model
Model Penal
Penal
Code have stated, imposing punishment
almost
punishment in such cases is almost
"bound to be an ineffective
divorced
invariably ''bound
ineffective threat
threat [and would] be divorced
base.166
from any moral base."66

IV.
IV.

SHOULD
INVOLVING THE
SHOULD DURESS
DURESS BE A
A DEFENSE TO A CRIME
CRIME INVOLVING
THE
KILLING OF DOZENS
DOZENS OF INNOCENT HUMAN
HUMAN BEINGS?
BEINGS?

Heroism, and
and the Seriousness
Seriousness
A. Proportionality,
Proportionality, Demanding
Demanding Heroism,
Thesis
of the Offense Thesis
67
Crimes against humanity often involve murder.
murder.67
Therefore, one
could argue that if duress is a defense
to
murder,
it
should
also be a
defense
defense to crimes against
that
involve
humanity
murder.
However,
a
against
involve
majority of the justices
in
Erdemovic
reasoned
that,
even
if
duress
is
justices
Erdemouic
is
a defense to murder, it does not follow that it should also be a defense
68 According to these
to the large-scale
large-scale killings of innocent
innocent civilians. 68
judges, crimes
against
humanity,
unlike
discrete
acts of murder,
crimes against
"affect, or should affect, each and every member of mankind,
whatever his or her nationality, ethnic group and location."69
location. '69 As a
result of this, they contend that a crime against humanity is a more
heinous offense
offense than murder and, for that reason, defendants
defendants should
not be allowed to plead duress
as
a
defense
to
a crime against
against
duress
humanity even if they are allowed
to
do
so
when
charged
with
allowed
when
with
70
7o
murder.

63.
Duress Defense's Uncharted
Uncharted Terrain:
Terrain:
See, e.g., Steven J.
J. Mulroy, The Duress
Applying it to Murder,
Retarded Defendant,
Murder, Felony Murder,
Murder, and the Mentally Retarded
Defendant, 43 SAN
SAN
also JOSHUA DRESSLER,
LAw
DIEGO L. REV. 159 (2006); see also
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
CRIMINAL LAw
325-26 (4th ed. 2005) (discussing
(discussing whether duress is a justification or an excuse);
supra note 28, at 830-31
FLETCHER, supra
830-31 (discussing duress as an excuse).
64.
II-III.
See supra
supra Parts II-III.
65.
Id.
66.
MODEL
COMMENTARIES §2.09 (1985).
MODEL PENAL
PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES
67.
See CASSESE,
supranote 14 (discussing crimes
CASSESE, supra
crimes against humanity).
68.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case
See Prosecutor
Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint
Joint Separate Opinion
Opinion
of Judges
1997).
Judges McDonald
McDonald and Vohrah, ~ 75 (Oct. 7, 1997).
69.
Id.
Id. ~ 21.
2l.
70.
It is said that, all things being
graver
It
being equal, a crime
crime against humanity
humanity is a graver
offense
offense than a discrete murder because of the "collective nature" of the victim. See
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7S5

aforementioned argument as the
This Article
Article refers to the aforementioned
"seriousness
of the
thesis. Proponents
Proponents of this thesis hold
"seriousness of
the offense"
offense" thesis.
that, even though duress is usually a defense to any crime, it
it may
properly
properly be disallowed
disallowed when
when the social
social harm caused
caused by the
commission
the offense
disproportional to the harm
commission of 'the
offense is extremely
extremely disproportional
71
averted.
averted.71
The following hypotheticals
hypotheticals test the viability of this thesis:
Coerced Murderer:
Murderer: Hugo threatened
of
(1) The Coerced
threatened to take the life of
Angel's son if Angel refused
refused to kill Gary, an innocent third
charged with
person. Angel capitulated
capitulated to the threat. He was charged
murdering Gary. Angel pleaded duress.
Coerced Terrorist:
(2) The Coerced
Terrorist: Frank threatened
threatened to kill Jerry, a wellknown maker of explosives, if Jerry refused to help him build a
bomb that was to be placed inside
inside a government
government building. Jerry
succumbed to the threat and helped Frank
succumbed
Frank build the bomb
bomb and
place it
it inside the building. More than one hundred
hundred innocent
innocent
people died when the bomb exploded. Jerry was charged
charged with
murdering the people
people inside the building. He pleaded duress.
(3)
(3)

The Nuclear
Nuclear Bomb: Jack is a nuclear
nuclear physicist employed by the
government to help with the design of nuclear bombs. Lazarus
Lazarus
threatened
threatened to kill Jack's family if Jack refused to design,
manufacture, and help him detonate
detonate a nuclear
nuclear bomb
bomb over
over Los
Los
Angeles. Jack yielded to the coercion
coercion and helped Lazarus
Lazarus fulfill
his plan. Over half a million people
people died. Jack
Jack was charged with
murdering the people
people who died when the nuke exploded. He
pleaded
pleaded duress.

Arguably, the harm caused by the coerced murderer
murderer is less
harm
serious than the one caused
caused by the coerced terrorist. The harm
produced by the nuclear physicist, however, is clearly graver the ones
ones
caused in the other
other two cases. Applying the seriousness of the offense
offense
thesis to these three hypotheticals
hypotheticals would yield the following results:
Coerced Murderer:
(1) The Coerced
Murderer: The harm produced
produced by the defendant
defendant
(Gary's death) is not much graver
graver than the one averted (Angel's
son's death).
death). Therefore,
Therefore, there are good arguments
arguments in favor of
of

Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive
of
Expressive Capacity
Capacity of International
International Punishment:
Punishment: The Limits of
InternationalCriminal
Criminal Law, 43 STAN.
the National
National Law Analogy and
and the Potential
Potential of International
STAN. J.
J.
L. 39, 59
INT'L L.
59 (2007).
71.
See, e.g., Dressier,
supra note 12, at 254
Dressler, supra
supra note 9; see also DUBBER, supra
254
certain death, the Code thus allows a
emergencies, facing almost certain
("Even in extreme emergencies,
balanced the potential
potential harms of action and inaction, to herself
herself
defense only if the actor balanced
and others, and then chooses the less harmful
harmful course of action (or inaction).").
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permitting the actor to plead duress as a defense to the crime
charged.
charged.
(2)
(2)

The Coerced
Coerced Terrorist:
Terrorist: The harm wreaked by the defendant (the
(the
The
deaths of one hundred people) is greater than the loss prevented
deaths
(his and his family's deaths). In spite of this, it is not clear of
of
(his
how much greater a magnitude was the harm produced than the
one averted. However, it is plausible
plausible that, in light of the large
of
number of deaths caused
caused by the defendant's action, his plea of
duress as a defense to the crime charged
charged should fail.

(3)
(3)

The Nuclear
Nuclear Bomb:
defendant's action
action
The
Bomb: The harm caused by the defendant's
(more than half a million deaths) is much greater
greater than the one
produced
prevented (the deaths of his loved ones). The harm produced
was extremely
extremely disproportional to the one averted. Therefore, if
was
one assumes that Jack could have avoided causing such grave
one
harm by
by not
not yielding
yielding to the threat, there are compelling reasons
harm
in favor
favor of
disallowing duress
duress as
defense to the offense
in
of disallowing
as aa defense
offense charged.

The
arguments in favor of allowing
The arguments
allowing the coerced
coerced murderer
murderer to
plead the duress defense while at the same time disallowing the
defense by the nuclear
nuclear physicist
physicist are well-established. The case of the
coerced
coerced terrorist is a closer
closer call, but the seriousness of the offense
offense
thesis offers intuitive support for punishing
punishing the defendant.
defendant.
There is some support in philosophical
literature for the
There
philosophical literature
Several well-known
seriousness of the offense
offense thesis. Several
well-known scholars seem
seem
to believe that individuals may be required
required to perform heroic acts of
of
self-sacrifice if that is the
self-sacrifice
the only
only way
way of saving numerous
numerous lives.
Professor
Joshua Dressler, for example, has argued
argued that
that
Professor Joshua
[s]ociety...
[s]ociety ... has a right to expect
expect a person to demonstrate
demonstrate a higher
higher level
of moral
moral strength
strength when
when ordered to kill a hundred
hundred innocent
innocent children
children
of
than when
than
when commanded
commanded to kill one. A
A jury
jury might also
also rightly
rightly expect
expect
people to manifest
strength-~lVen, at some point, to
to
manifest the utmost moral strength--even,
choose
death-when they
choose death-when
they have reason to know that
that they are playing
playing a
part, even a minor role, in an especially
especially barbaric
barbaric scenario, such as the
72
Holocaust. 72

Similarly, Professor Fletcher
human
Fletcher has stated that
that "if the cost in human
lives is sufficiently high we
could
properly
someone to resist
we could properly expect
expect someone
resist
'73
threats
threats to his own life."
life."73 Likewise,
Likewise, Professor
Professor Paul Robinson
Robinson
concluded
criminal law defenses
defenses that
that
concluded in his treatise on criminal
[i]t
lilt is
is reasonable
reasonable to
to assume
assume that given
given threats
threats of equal
equal gravity,
gravity, the
resistance
resistance of
of the
the person of
of reasonable
reasonable firmness would
would be
be
directly
compelled offense.
directly related
related to the seriousness
seriousness of the compelled
offense. The
The
law-abiding
law-abiding person
person may
may be unable
unable to resist coercion
coercion if he must
must commit
commit

72.
72.
73.
73.

Dressler, supra
supra note 9, at 1374.
1374.
FLETCHER,
FLETCHER, supra
supra note
note 28,
28, at 833.
833.
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forgery to avoid the threat but able to resist the same threat if he must
must
74
kill an innocent. 74

The intuitions grounding the seriousness
seriousness of the offense
offense thesis are
shared
shared by criminal
criminal law theorists on the other side of the Atlantic.
Spanish
commentators Bustos
Hormazdbal, for example, have
Spanish commentators
Bustos and Hormazabal,
asserted
asserted that "although [duress] allows
allows for an exemption
exemption from
punishment
punishment in cases in which the harm caused
caused is greater than the
[avoided], the harm caused
greater
one [avoided],
caused cannot be disproportionately
disproportionately greater
averted] .
[than the one averted]."75
These
These scholars
scholars hint at the possibility that, under
under certain
circumstances-such as when the harm that the actor is coerced
coerced to
to
circumstances-such
extremely disproportional
disproportional to the one averted-it
averted-it might be
inflict is extremely
if
proper for society to demand
demand that the agent resist the threat even if
this requires sacrificing her own life. Although
Although this conclusion
conclusion is
intuitively appealing, it raises several problems.
Accepting
Accepting this thesis would lead
lead to punishing
punishing the defendants in
the coerced terrorist
terrorist and nuclear bomb cases for failing to make a
heroic sacrifice so that many people can live. This is contrary to the
principle that the law has no right to demand that people engage
engage in
76
heroism. 76
acts of
ofheroism.
This principle
principle is so entrenched
entrenched in U.S. criminal law
that the drafters of the Model Penal
Penal Code expressly stated
stated that the
basis for the exculpation
exculpation afforded by the duress defense
defense is that itit
would be socially debilitating
debilitating to "demand that heroism be the
' '77
standard of legality.
legality."77
After all, "the standard
standard is that of the
hero. '78 Moreover, for the law to
reasonable man, not the reasonable hero."78
most
demand heroic self-sacrifice
self-sacrifice would be hypocritical because
because most
moral firmness are incapable of abiding by such
persons of reasonable
reasonable
such
79
a high standard. 79
This alone does not resolve the question against demanding
demanding that
ordinary people act in heroic ways, as Professor
Professor Dressler has rightly
pointed out:
It
It is not inevitably hypocritical for a juror
juror to concede that most people
in the sa~ne
salPe situation, including the juror, would have acted as the
defendant
defendant did, yet still believe
believe that the coerced
coerced actor deserves
deserves to be
punished. As long as the juror believes
believes that the juror also would be

ROBINSON,
supranote 46, at 367 (emphasis added).
ROBINSON, supra
74.
75.
BUSTOS RAMIREZ
RAMiREZ & HORMAZABAL
HORMAZABAL MALAREE,
MALARtE, supra
supra note 53, at 387.
For cases that suggest that the law cannot demand heroism from its
76.
citizens,
State v.
Van
citizens, see, for example, State
u. Toscano,
Toscano, 378 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1977), and State v. Van
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003).
1163 (N.J.
Dyke, 825 A.2d 1163
MODEL
COMMENTARIES § 2.09 (1985).
MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES
77.
78.
Alan Reed, Duress
and Provocation
Provocationas
as Excuses to Murder:
Murder: Salutary
Salutary Lessons
Duress and
from
Jurisprudence,6 J. TRANSNAT'L.
POL'Y 51, 55 (1996).
from Recent Anglo-American Jurisprudence,
TRANSNAT'L. L. & POL'y
MODEL
MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES
COMMENTARIES § 2.09 (1985).
79.
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it) in the same
deserving of punishment (and, presumably, would accept it)
80
hypocrisy.
situation, there is no hypocrisy.80

An additional problem
problem with the seriousness of the offense
offense thesis
defended "hard
is that it cannot be easily reconciled
reconciled with the widely defended
"involuntariness" theories of duress. According
choice"
choice" and "involuntariness"
According to the
coercive
hard choice
choice theory of duress, an actor is excused
excused when the coercive
situation puts him in the undesirable
undesirable position
position of having to decide to
others.8 1 Those who
preserve either his interests or the interests of others.81
culpably if they choose
face this "do
"do it or else" situation
situation do not act culpably
choose to
harm others because
because society believes
believes that a reasonable
reasonable person facing
manner.8 2 The
the same hard choice would have acted in the same manner.82
hard choice
choice theory
theory of duress produces different results than the
seriousness of the offense
offense thesis because the actors in the cases of the
coerced terrorist and the nuclear
nuclear bomb faced what could be called an
an
coerced
conclusion reached
unfairly hard choice.
choice. Thus, contrary
contrary to the conclusion
reached earlier
earlier
acquitted
regarding these cases, they should both be acquitted
in this Subpart regarding
under the hard choice theory of the duress
duress defense.
The same results
results follow from an examination of the
involuntariness
According to this theory, duress
involuntariness theory of duress. 8833 According
choice-making capabilities
capabilities are substantially
exculpates actors whose choice-making
exculpates
coercive situation that generates the defense.8844 This
reduced by the coercive
reduction in the actor's capacity
capacity to choose not to yield to the threat
threat
makes her choice to engage in the wrongful
wrongful act tantamount to a
85
her.85
Thus, it has been
been stated
decision that has been forced upon her.
that the actor's choice to protect her interests
interests at the expense
expense of others
actor
is in reality "no choice at all" and that duress exculpates
exculpates the actor
of
because her capacity to choose
choose to do otherwise
otherwise is "absent" in light of
the coercion.8866 In a similar vein, an English court has asserted
asserted that
defendant
duress is an excuse when the coercion faced by the defendant

1368-69.
Dressier, supra
80.
Dressler,
supra note 9, at 1361>-69.
See infra
infra note 82.
81.
For an examination
examination and defense of the "hard-choice" theory of excuse and
82.
and Desert,
Desert, in FROM SOCIAL
duress, see Stephen J. Morse, Deprivation
Deprivation and
SOCIAL JUSTICE TO
TO
CRIMINAL LAw
124-29
CRIMINAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
JUSTICE: POVERTY
POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL
LAw 124-29
Michael S. Moore,
& John Kleinig eds., 2000); Michael
(William C. Heffernan &
Moore, Responsibility
Responsibility
1663-64 (1990).
and the Unconscious,
Unconscious, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1563, 1567, 1663-64
and
involuntariness theory of duress has informed various state supreme
83.
The involuntariness
court decisions about the scope and nature of the defense. See, e.g.,
e.g., State v. Rouleau,
Rouleau,
528 A.2d 343, 350 (Conn.
(Conn. 1987) (stating that since
since the effect of duress is to "reduce the
person to a state of involuntariness,"
involuntariness," the prosecution
prosecution should bear the burden
burden of
of
disproving the defense
defense beyond a reasonable doubt); see also People v. Graham, 57 Cal.
App. 3d 238 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)
1976) (asserting that a claim of duress "casts doubt on the
added)).
voluntariness of the [defendant's]
[defendant's] acts" (emphasis added».
voluntariness
Self, 105
and the Boundaries
See Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility
84.
Responsibility and
Boundaries of the Self,
of
("[T]he defense of duress does not suggest a total lack of
HARV.
HARV. L. REV. 959, 997
997 (1992)
(1992) ("[Tlhe
choice. Instead, the defendant
defendant points to a severe
severe limitation
limitation of choice
choice caused by a
serious threat
threat made against him.").
DUBBER, supra
supranote 12, at 251.
85.
Id.
86.
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"overb[ears]" the
the defendant's
will to
such aa degree that the offense
"overb[ears]"
defendant's will
to such
committed
considered to be the consequence
committed can "no' longer" be considered
consequence of her
her
"voluntary
act[s]." 87
"voluntaryact[s]."87
The involuntariness
involuntariness theory is also incompatible
incompatible with the
intuitive
coerced terrorist and the nuclear
intuitive solution to the cases of the coerced
nuclear
bomb. While the seriousness of the offense thesis would lead to the
convictions
acquitted under an
convictions of both defendants, they would be acquitted
an
involuntariness
involuntariness theory of duress because the coercion
coercion to which they
were
significantly reduced
were subjected significantly
reduced their ability to choose not to
commit
commit the crime.
Despite the logical appeal of the seriousness
seriousness of the offense thesis,
it seems fair to say that, in view of the aforementioned
aforementioned problems,
"[v]ery
...and in particular
particular
"[v]ery much more needs to be said about duress ...
about
about whether the law can
can properly
properly sometimes demand
demand heroism of
of
88
us."
Thus, the next Part elaborates
elaborates an alternative conception
conception of the
us."88
duress
adequately account for the seriousness
seriousness of the
duress defense that can adequately
offense
offense thesis without
without falling prey to the problems
problems that plague
plague the
hard choice
choice and involuntariness
involuntariness theories. First, however, the next
next
Part demonstrates
demonstrates why these two conceptions
conceptions of duress cannot
cannot
satisfactorily explain many features
features of the defense.
defense.
satisfactorily
Hard Choice
Choice and Involuntariness
InvoluntarinessTheories:
Theories:Duress
B. Beyond the Hard
Duress as
an "Understandable
"UnderstandableChoice"
an
well-known scholars
Contrary to what some well-known
scholars have
have argued, the
exculpatory nature of the duress defense does not entirely
exculpatory
entirely lie in the
fact that the coercive situation substantially
substantially reduced
reduced the choicemaking capabilities
extremely hard nature of the
capabilities of the actor, in the extremely
choice faced by the person coerced, or in the involuntariness
involuntariness of the
89
actor's decision to engage in the conduct. 89
Regarding the hard choice
choice
theory, it is not difficult to imagine examples of cases in which a
person would be convicted
convicted of an offense even though his decision to
commit
extremely unfair
offense was the product
product of an extremely
unfair and hard
commit the offense
choice. For example, someone
an
someone who causes serious bodily harm to an
innocent person in order to avoid losing all his possessions
possessions should be
punished, even though his decision to engage in the conduct
conduct
constitutive
consequence of an unfair and hard
constitutive of the offense was the consequence
choice.
choice.

R v.
87.
v, Hudson, (1971) 2 Q.B. 202, 206.
R. A. Duff,
Duff, Virtue,
Virtue, Vice and
and Criminal
Criminal Liability:
Do We Want an
an Aristotelian
88.
Liability: Do
Aristotelian
CriminalLaw?, 6 BUFF. CRIM.
Criminal
CRIM. L. REV. 147, 177 n.48
nA8 (2002).
89.
See generally
generally DUBBER, supra
supra note 12, at 251-59 (discussing the duress
defense);
supra note 82 at 124-29 (giving an overview of the involuntariness
involuntariness
defense); Morse, supra
and hard-choice
hard· choice theories, respectively).
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Regarding
involuntariness theory, it should be noted that a
Regarding the involuntariness
involuntary. 90
coerced actor's decision to yield to threats is not really involuntary.9o
Even though the choice
actor
choice that the actor faces is a difficult one, the actor
retains the capacity to choose
choose not to capitulate to the coercive
coercive
demands. Thus, describing his conduct as involuntary is either false
91 Furthermore, the law routinely authorizes
or misleading. 91
authorizes imposing
punishment on defendants
defendants who lack a substantial
unmitigated punishment
capacity
capacity to control their acts. 92 Take, for example, the case of a
defendant who, in a moment of temporary loss of self-control, shoots
defendant
someone who had just finished raping his wife. Assuming
and injures someone
that the victim survived the defendant's
defendant's attack, the law
law affords him
93 If defendants
defendants in this
no partial
partial or full excuse for his conduct. 93
context are not excused in spite of their impaired
impaired volitional faculties,
it is unclear
unclear why they should be exempted
exempted from responsibility
responsibility when
when
the alleged involuntariness
involuntariness is the product of coercion.
An examination
examination of German criminal law and the German
German Penal
Code further illustrates the shortcomings of the hard choice and
involuntariness
involuntariness conceptions
conceptions of duress. According to § 35 of the
coerced actor
actor
German Penal Code, duress is a defense
defense when the coerced
"commits an
act to
avert [an
[an imminent
imminent danger to life, limb,
"commits
an unlawful
unlawful act
to avert
or freedom] from himself, a relative or person
person close to him."94
him. ' 94 Notice
coerced actor
that the defense
defense does not apply if the coerced
actor yields to the
95
Thus, even though
threat so that harm to property can be avoided. 95
though
Aunt Maria loves Roxy-her
three-year-old Yorkie-as
Roxy-her three-year-old
Yorkie-as if she were
her child, she would not be entitled
of
entitled to a duress defense under § 35 of
of
the German
German Penal Code if she chose to destroy the property of

90.
& Mangiafico, supra
See Westen &
supra note 60, at 901 (stating that situations of
of
involuntariness is deemed
duress "differ significantly" from instances
instances in which involuntariness
deemed to be a
defense to criminal liability).
91.
Perhaps because
because of the misleading
misleading nature of the assertion that duress gives
gives
Stephen Morse
rise to a claim of involuntariness,
involuntariness, Professor
Professor Stephen
Morse has pointed
pointed out that the
involuntariness inherent
inherent in duress is "metaphorical."
Stephen J. Morse,
Uncontrollable
Urges and
and Irrational
Uncontrollable Urges
Irrational People,
People, 88 VA. L. REV.
REV. 1025,
1025, 1056 (2002).
92.
See Alon Harel, Efficiency and Fairness
Case for
Fairness in Criminal
Criminal Law: The Case
for a
Criminal Law Principle
ComparativeFault,
1214 n.92 (1994)
Criminal
Principle of Comparative
Fault, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1181,
1181, 1214
(1994)
(noting that individuals
... impulses" such as "anger"
"anger" can be "liable
individuals who "fail to control
control ...
{noting
for unmitigated homicide or murder" (quoting GEORGE P. FLETCHER,
RETHINKING
FLETCHER, RETHINKlNG
(1978))).
CRIMINAL LAW
LAw 247 (1978»).
93.
Id. It
It should be pointed out that had the victim in this hypothetical case
died, the defendant would have a valid "heat of passion" claim that would reduce
reduce his
responsibility
responsibility from murder
murder to manslaughter.
manslaughter. The Author finds allowing
allowing "passion" as a
partial
partial defense to murder and
and disallowing
disallowing it
it in other contexts
contexts is somewhat
somewhat arbitrary.
For a convincing
generic claim of "partial
convincing argument in favor the creation of a generic
responsibility" available as a defense
Stephen J.
defense to any crime, see Stephen
J. Morse, Diminished
Diminished
Rationality,
Responsibility, 1 OHIO ST. J.
J. CRIM. L. 289, 289 (2003).
Rationality, Diminished
Diminished Responsibility,
94.
Strafgesetzbuch [StGB)
[StGB] [penal
[Penal Code)
Code] Nov. 13, 1998 BGBI. I at 945, § 35,
Strafgesetzbuch
1 (F.R.G.) translated
translatedin
~ 1
in 28 THE AMERICAN
AMERICAN SERIES
SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL
PENAL CODES (Edward
M. Wise ed.,
1987), available
available at http://wings.buffalo.edu/
ed., Joseph J. Darby trans.,
trans., 1987),
http://wings.buffalo.edul
law/bclc/germind.htm.
lawlbclclgermind.htm.
95.
Id.
Id.
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another
another in order to avoid harm to her beloved
beloved dog. This limitation
makes
involuntariness theory
makes little sense under a hard choice or involuntariness
theory of
of
duress. Aunt Maria
Maria loves Roxy very, very much. Consequently,
choosing between the wellbeing
wellbeing of her dog and causing harm to the
property
property of a stranger represents an unfairly hard choice for Maria.
Also, in light of the incredible, almost maternal, love that she feels for
capacity to choose not to harm her dog is substantially
Roxy, her capacity
reduced by the coercive
coercive situation. Alas, even if her choice is a very
difficult one and her decision is not free from unfair constraints, she
has no duress defense
defense according to German criminal law.
The limitations that § 35 of the German Penal Code
Code imposes
imposes on
on
the duress defense
defense are not unique to continental legal systems. The
drafters of the U.S. Model Penal
limit
Penal Code (MPC) also intended
intended to limit
the defense in a similar manner. Even though at first glance the
provision contained in § 2.09 of the MPC appears
appears to provide a defense
to anyone who yields to threats as long as it is demonstrated
demonstrated that a
''person of
reasonable firmness"
the actor's
actor's situation
situation would have
"person
of reasonable
firmness" in
in the
96
also succumbed
succumbed to the coercion,
coercion,96
the Commentaries
Commentaries to the MPC
make it clear that some threats should never give rise to a valid claim
claim
97 Thus, the Commentaries
Commentaries to § 2.09 state that:
of duress.
duress. 97
Given
Given the nature of the problem [regarding
[regarding the proper
proper limits of the
duress defense]
defense] and the criteria proposed
proposed for its solution, it is
is
reasonable
reasonable to confine the exculpation
exculpation to the case where force against
against
the person of the actor or another, or the threat thereof, is the
instrument
.... [W]hen the claimed excuse is that duress
instrument of coercion ....
was
or even reputation
reputation cannot
exercise
was irresistible, threats
threats to property
property or
cannot exercise
sufficient power over persons
"reasonable firmness"
persons of "reasonable
firmness" to warrant
warrant
8
9
terms.98
consideration
consideration in
in these
these terms.

It turns out that, despite its apparently broader formulation, the
It
MPC duress provision is almost identical in scope
scope to the duress
provision of the German
Penal
Code.
Whereas
threats
or
German Penal
Whereas threats to the life or
limb of the coerced actor might provide
a
valid
excuse
under
the
provide
under
99
German Penal Code and the MPC,
threats to property
other
MPC,99
property and other
legally
protected
interests
are
not
susceptible
to
the
duress
defense
legally
susceptible
00
under
code.'100
Hence, Aunt Maria would
under either
either code.
would not fare better
better in an

MODEL
2.09(1) (1962).
(1962).
96.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1)
COMMENTARIES § 2.09 cmt. 3 (1985)
97.
See MODEL
MODEL PENAL
PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES
(1985) (outlining
limitations
limitations to the duress defense).
Id.
98.
Id. (emphasis added).
Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [penal
[Penal Code] Nov. 13,
99.
Strafgesetzbuch
13, 1998 BGBI. II at 945, § 35,
translatedin 28 THE AMERICAN
~ 1 (F.R.G.) translated
AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL
PENAL CODES (Edward
1987), available
available at http://wings.buffalo.edullaw/
http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/
M. Wise
Wise ed., Joseph
Joseph J.
J. Darby trans., 1987),
bclc/germind.htm; MODEL
MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.09(1)
2.09(1) (1962).
(1962).
bclc/germind.htm;
See Strafgesetzbuch
Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [penal
[Penal Code]
100.
Code] Nov. 13,
13, 1998 BGBI.
BGBI. II at 945,
CODES
§ 35, ~1 1 (F.R.G.) translated
translated in 28 THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES
(Edward
1987),
available at
(Edward M. Wise ed.,
ed., Joseph J.
J. Darby trans., 1987),
available
at
http://wings.buffalo.edu/lawlbclc/germind.htm (excluding
http://wings.buffalo.edullawlbclclgermind.htm
(excluding application of the duress
duress
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of
MPC jurisdiction,
jurisdiction, for a threat of harm to her dog is, as a matter of
coercion to warrant an exemption from criminal
law, not sufficient coercion
criminal
responsibility.
The best way to explain this limitation
limitation on the scope
scope of the
to
those who
understand
that
the
exculpation
afforded
defense is to understand
exculpation
determination that the
act under duress is the product of a societal
societal determination
choice
choice to commit
commit a crime in order to avoid harm to an actor's interests
interests
sufficiently comprehensible
comprehensible to
or the interests of her loved ones
ones is sufficiently
exemption from punishment, while the choice to commit
warrant an exemption
commit a
crime to avert harm to a dog (or other highly valued property) is not.
German scholar Claus Roxin has asserted:
Thus, as the German
The
[limitations set forth in § 35 of the Penal Code]
The truth is that the [limitations
[are] explained
cases that fall within
within the
explained by the fact that only in [the cases
provision] does the wrongful act performed
scope
scope of the text of the provision]
performed
sufficient understanding
[under duress]
duress] find sufficient
understanding amongst [the
[the public]
101
seems defensible.
[exculpation] seems
that the [exculpation]
defensible.1° 1

conception of duress, which this
Therefore,
Therefore, according to this conception
"understandable choice" theory, the gist of the
Article
Article calls the "understandable
of
defense lies in the "understandable" or "comprehensible" nature of
coerced actor and not in the "psychological
the choice made
made by the coerced
10 2
created by the threat.
Of course, there
pressure" or "unfair choice" created
threat.102
are situations in which the emotional pressure produced
produced by the threat
threat
or the unfair choice
choice should be taken into account when deciding
to
whether the actor should escape
escape punishment
punishment because his decision to
conduct is understandable.
However, the
engage in harmful conduct
circumstances-emotional pressure
existence of one or both of these circumstances-emotional
choice--does not conclusively
or a hard choice-does
conclusively establish that the actor
actor
should be absolved from responsibility
responsibility for engaging
engaging in the wrongful
wrongful
absence of either
either of these factors does not
not
act. Furthermore, the absence
one
might
reasonably
necessarily
make
the
defense
fail.
Thus,
necessarily
defense
reasonably
conclude that the extreme
conclude
extreme pressure suffered
suffered by the actor
actor and the
unfair choice that the actor faced do not generate sufficient
sufficient
"understanding amongst
to warrant
"understanding
amongst the
the public"
public" to
warrant an exemption
exemption from
punishment. This explanation
explanation describes
describes precisely
precisely what happens in
in
the case of Aunt Maria.
commentators have advanced
Various
Various Spanish commentators
advanced similar
10 3
Professor
Varona
G6mez, for
for
conceptions
of
the
duress
defense.
conceptions
loa Professor
Gomez,
act
society
usually
excuses
people
who
people
act
example, has stated that society

defense to harm to property);
property); MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES
COMMENTARIES § 2.09
2.09 cmt. 3
(1985) (same).
(same).
Pefia trans., 2d
2d
CLAus
101.
CLAUS ROXIN, DERECHO
DERECHO PENAL
PENAL PARTE GENERAL
GENERAL 909 (Luz6n
(Luzon Peiia
ed.
2000).
ed.2000).
102.
Id.
102.
[d.
& HORMAZABAL
supra note 53; DANIEL
See, e.g., BUSTOS RAMIREZ
103.
RAMiREZ &
HORMAZABAL MALARE,
MALAREE, supra
EXIMENTE DESDE UNA
VARONA G6MEZ, UNA
UNA RECONSTRUCcI6N
RECONSTRUCCI6N DE LA EXlMENTE
UNA TEORiA DE LA
LA
(2000).
JUSTICIA (2000).
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coerced
understanding that the coerced
under duress because of a shared
shared understanding
actor "cannot turn away from his concrete
concrete interests when he is
confronted]. ' 104
[dilemmatic choice with which he
evaluating
he is
is confronted]."I04
evaluating the [dilemmatic
leads the person who acts under duress to "give more
This, in turn, leads
interests and to those of his loved ones"
weight to his own personal interests
10 5
By exculpating
exculpating coerced actors
than to the interests of strangers. I05
personal injury at the expense of harming others,
who choose
choose to avoid personal
of
the state acknowledges
even though from an objective point of
acknowledges that, even
view the interests of a person
person who acts under duress have
have no more
interests of the actor's innocent victim, it is
weight than the interests
comprehensible that citizens attach
comprehensible
attach more value to their own ends
06
than to the ends of the strangers or of the community.'
community.lo6
That is,
conduct is
society generally
generally considers that the coerced actor's conduct
07
understandable. lo7
In a similar vein, Bustos Ramirez
wrongful, but understandable.
Hormaz6bal Malaree
Malar~e have
and Hormazabal
have claimed
claimed that coerced
coerced individuals
individuals
excused because
because their decision to prefer their own interests
interests
should be excused
08
over those of others is socially comprehensible.
In light of the
comprehensible. 1lOS
comprehensibility of these preferences, the law should not punish
comprehensibility
punish
those who solve the dilemma
dilemma by harming others in order to avoid
personal injury.I09
injury.10 9
whether the coerced
coerced actor's decision
decision to engage in the
Asking whether
understandable from a societal
wrongful act is understandable
societal perspective
perspective can better
better
actor
explain the seriousness
seriousness of the offense thesis than asking if the actor
faced an unfairly
unfairly hard choice, or whether
whether her act was voluntary or a
product of her free will. While it is clear that a person who kills
an
many people
people in order to save herself or her loved ones faces an
unfairly hard choice
choice and that her capacity
capacity to choose freely to resist
resist
the threats is significantly reduced by the coercive
coercive situation, it is less
clear whether
whether her decision to engage
engage in such
such an act finds sufficient
sufficient
exemption from
understanding among the community to warrant an exemption
understanding
from
punishment. This is particularly
particularly true when
when the actor's decision to
to
perform the wrongful act jeopardizes
jeopardizes the continued
continued existence
existence of the
community, which might occur when the offense committed by the
defendant is a crime against
coerced defendant
against humanity.
significant
An actor who chooses
chooses to save herself by wiping out a significant
number of members of the community is unlikely
unlikely to provoke

supra note 103, at 122.
104.
VARONA
VARONA G6MEZ, supra
Id.
105.
Id.
Id.
106.
Id.
appears to believe
believe that
that the
the
107.
Professor Larry Alexander also appears
understandability of the actor's decision
decision to engage in a wrongful act is an essential
essential
feature of excuse defenses. See Larry Alexander, Self-Defense, Justification
Justification and
represent
Excuse, 22 PHIL. &
& PUB. AFF. 53, 53 (1993) (stating that excuses
Excuse,
excuses represent
"understandable though
though regrettable
human reaction[s]"
reaction[s]" to extreme
circumstances
"understandable
regrettable human
extreme circumstances
(emphasis added)).
added».
supra note
108.
HORMAZABAL MALARtE,
BUSTOS RAMiREZ
RAMiREZ & HORMAZABAL
MALAREE, supra
note 53.
Id.
380-81.
109.
Id. at 380-81.
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sufficient feelings of understanding
understanding among the public to justify
sufficient
relieving
her
of
criminal
Thus a society
relieving
criminal responsibility.
society might
might
legitimately
require
heroic
self-sacrifice
in
the
face of coercion
legitimately
self-sacrifice
coercion to
commit
commit a crime against humanity. The same society, however,
however, might
might
properly decline
decline to demand such a high level
level of courage when the
interests
interests at stake are not as monumental.
In view of these considerations, the understandable
understandable choice theory
improves
improves upon its competitors' explanation of the defense of duress,
retaining
advantages of the seriousness of the offense thesis while
retaining the advantages
avoiding its problems. However, the limitations
limitations of the duress defense
in light of this theory remain
remain unexplored. The remaining Part
Part
considers
considers factors that should be taken
taken into account
account when determining
whether
whether a coerced actor's conduct
conduct is understandable
understandable from a societal
viewpoint.
of
viewpoint. Ultimately, these factors determine what degree of
proportionality,
proportionality, if any, should
should exist between the harm caused
caused and the
harm averted in order
order for the duress defense to be pleaded
pleaded
successfully.
CommunitarianObligations,
Obligations,Proportionality,
Proportionality,and
and the
C. Communitarian
UnderstandableChoice
Choice Theory
Theory of Duress
Understandable
Duress

1.

Voluntarily Assumed
Voluntarily
Assumed Obligations
Proportionality
Proportionality Standards
Standards

of

Self-Sacrifice
Self-Sacrifice

and

Whether
order
Whether a coerced actor's decision
decision to harm a third party in order
to avoid harm to the actor's personal interests generates
generates sufficient
sufficient
understanding
understanding among the public to warrant
warrant exempting
exempting him from
from
criminal
criminal liability depends
depends in large part on whether
whether the actor breached
breached
his communitarian
communitarian obligations
obligations when he chose
chose to engage in the
10
wrongful
disallowed as
wrongful act.'
act.110
It has been
been said that duress should be disallowed
a defense when "the persons
assumed a special
persons involved
involved had assumed
special duty to
protect
collectivity."11' This is most evidently
protect the collectivity."111
evidently the case
case when the
coerced
capitulates to threats
coerced actor capitulates
threats even though in the past he had
had
self-sacrifice that required him to
voluntarily assumed
assumed obligations of self-sacrifice
12
resist coercive threats.
threats.112

Change of Venue and the Role of the Criminal
110.
See Laurie L. Levenson, Change
Criminal
Jury,
"[t]he duress
Jury, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1533, 1555 n.122 (1993)
(1993) (noting that "[tJhe
defense ...
... entails a standard that looks to the values
values and politics of the affected
affected
community.").
111.
ROXIN,
101, at 914-15.
ROXIN, supra
supra note 101,
FRANcisco
Muiioz CONDE,
112.
FRANCISCO MUNOZ
CONDE, TEORiA
TEORlA GENERAL
GENERAL DEL DELITO
DELITO 174
174 (3d ed. 2004)
(stating that the duress defense
defense should
should be disallowed
disallowed when
when the defendant had assumed
the obligation to sacrifice his interests
interests for the well-being
well-being of the community).
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enforcement agents, firefighters, soldiers,
Cases involving law enforcement
11 3
paradigmatic examples
and seamen are paradigmatic
examples of this type of
of situation.
situation.1l3
To determine, for example, whether
whether to excuse a police
police officer who was
coerced into harming an innocent third party in order
coerced
order to avoid harm
to herself,
herself, one should consider
not
consider
only what a person of reasonable
firmness would have
have done in her situation, but also what duties police
police
officers typically
typically owe to innocent third parties. When evaluating the
coerced police officer's claim of duress, the decisive consideration
consideration
seems to be that the police officer had a duty to resist threats to her
her
own life in order
It
order to keep innocent third parties out of harm's way. It
is reasonable
reasonable to conclude
that,
in
light
of
this
voluntarily
conclude
assumed
duty of self-sacrifice, a police officer who fails to protect innocent
innocent
people because
sufficient
because she yields to coercion will not generate
generate sufficient
understanding among the community
understanding
community to gain an exemption from
from
punishment. Thus, as one leading German criminal
criminal law theorist
theorist has
aptly pointed out,
The [duty]
self-preservation is ...
...required
of
[duty] to control the instinct of self·preservation
required of
those who have assumed the obligation
of
obligation to tolerate
tolerate [threats]
[threats] in light of
their profession, even when the threats
endanger their lives. [The
[The
threats endanger
reason
circumstances when
reason for this is that] it is in precisely
precisely these circumstances
when the
1 14
them. 114
on them.
to rely
community
community should be
be able
able to
rely on

coerced actor voluntarily
Accordingly, whether a coerced
voluntarily assumed duties
of self-sacrifice
self-sacrifice should have
have a profound
profound effect on the proportionality
that society is willing to require in order for the actor to successfully
plead
plead duress. While a claim of duress might succeed even
even when
when the
harm caused by the defendant
defendant is greater
greater than the harm averted, this
voluntarily assumed a duty
is surely not the case when the actor had voluntarily
of self-sacrifice
self-sacrifice that required
required her not to yield to the coercion giving
rise to the defense. In the latter cases
cases it seems proper to deny the
actor's duress claim
claim unless the harm averted
averted by submitting to the
threat is significantly
significantly greater
greater than the one caused by complying with
with
the coercer's
demands.1 1155 Thus, a police
coercer's demands.1
police officer should not be
be
exempted
exempted from liability if,
if, to avoid a threat of grave
grave bodily harm, she
yields to a demand
demand that she kill an innocent
innocent person; however, the
police officer could be relieved
relieved of responsibility
responsibility if,
if, to avoid the same
threat, she yields to a demand
demand that she steal property.
The average person
person would
would have a sound duress claim in both
cases. However, because police officers have voluntarily assumed
assumed
duties of self-sacrifice
self-sacrifice that require
require them to "control their instinct of
of

GUNTHER
Contreras
113.
GDNTHER JAKOBS, DERECHO PENAL PARTE GENERAL 694 (Cuelo Contreras
&
& Rodriguez de Murillo
Murillo trans., 1995).
HANS
& THOMAS
THOMAS WEIGEND,
114.
HANS HEINRICH JESCHECK
JESCHECK &
WEIGEND, TRATADO DE DERECHO
PENAL 523 (Miguel
(Miguel Olmedo Cardenete
Cardenete trans., 5th
5th ed. 2002).
Id. at 523-24.
115.
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preservation"
preservation" more
more than
than the
the average
average person, they would
would only
only have
have a
116
valid
valid duress
duress defense
defense in
in the
the latter
latter case.
case. 116
2.
2.

Involuntarily
Involuntarily Assumed
Assumed Obligations
Obligations That Require
Require Self-Sacrifice
Self-Sacrifice
and More
More Stringent
Stringent Proportionality
Proportionality Standards
Standards

Although
Although most
most duties
duties of self-sacrifice
self-sacrifice are voluntarily
voluntarily assumed,
there
there are
are some
some instances
instances in which such
such duties
duties are imposed
imposed
This is most
involuntarily.
most evident
evident in the case of familial
involuntarily.
117 For
relationships,
such as
as relationships
relationships between
between parent
parent and child. 117
For
relationships, such
refuse
to
requires
that
a
father
relationship
the
parent-child
example,
example,
parent-child relationship requires
father
he
murders
his
be
killed
unless
that
he
will
to
a
threat
capitulate
capitulate
threat
unless
8
This involuntarily
small child. 1118
involuntarily imposed
imposed obligation
obligation surely affects
affects
successfully as a defense to a
the
the parent's
parent's ability
ability to plead
plead duress successfully
It seems
seems unlikely
unlikely that
that a father's,
crime involving
involving harm to his child. It
crime
his
child's
expense
of
life
at
the
decision
own
expense
child's life
life will
will
decision to save
save his own
community to justify
generate sufficient understanding
understanding among
among the community
generate
relieving him of criminal
criminal responsibility.
communitarian duties
The existence
existence of such communitarian
duties of self-sacrifice,
self-sacrifice, both
voluntarily assumed and involuntarily
involuntarily imposed, invites an
an
order
examination
examination of the proportionality
proportionality that
that should be required
required in order
for a parent to successfully
successfully plead
plead duress as a defense
defense to a crime
parent-child relationship,
involving harm to his child. Because of the parent-child
it seems
seems fair to require
require that
that the parent
parent endure greater
greater harm before
coercion than would be required from a person
person
yielding to the coercion
119 Hence, a father
unrelated
unrelated to the
the child. 119
father should only be able to plead
plead
duress
duress as an excuse
excuse to harming his child if the harm avoided
avoided by
by
caused
coercion was significantly greater
greater than the one caused
yielding to the coercion
120
This represents
represents an
to the child by capitulating
capitulating to the threats. 120
an
inversion of the proportionality
proportionality analysis that is undertaken in the
typical duress case that does not involve communitarian
communitarian duties of
of
12 1
self-sacrifice.
self-sacrifice. 121
self-sacrifice
Involuntary obligations
obligations of self-sacrifice
also arise in
in
circumstances
circumstances in which the only way for a coerced actor to protect
protect her
her
disproportionate to the
interests
interests is by causing a harm that is grossly
grossly disproportionate
threatened
threatened harm. Consequently,
Consequently, a coerced actor has a duty to suffer
suffer
moderate
moderate physical injury
injury if the only way of avoiding that injury is by

116.
Id.
116.
Id. at 523.
supranote 101,
101, at 920.
117.
ROXIN, supra
117.
118. Id.
Id.
118.
the Duty to
Obligation:Limits of the
Islands in a Sea of Obligation:
119. See David Schmidtz, Islands
119.
"it is relatively easy to argue that
LAW &
& PHIL. 683, 699 (2000) (noting that "it
Rescue, 19 LAw
that
people have positive obligations to children, especially their own children.").
120. Id.
Id.
120.
121. Involuntary duties of self-sacrifice arising out of familial relationships may
121.
extend to case other than those involving a parent and his child. Thus, for example, a
ROXIN, supra
husband may have similar obligations towards his wife. ROXIN,
supra note 101.
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122
killing an innocent
Similarly, a defendant
innocent third party.
party.122
defendant should not
not
be able to excuse the killing of hundreds or thousands of people
people by
by
pleading that she would have been killed if she had acted differently.
The reason for this is that society requires
requires citizens
citizens to assume
minimum
in
minimum obligations
obligations of solidarity
solidarity toward
toward their fellow citizens
citizens in
order to make life in community
community possible. 123 Thus, notwithstanding
the unfairly hard choice
defendant and the substantial
substantial
choice faced by the defendant
reduction
choice-making capabilities that the coercive
coercive situation
situation
reduction of choice-making
produces, a person who decides
decides to inflict a grossly disproportionate
harm to the one averted
averted probably
probably will not find sufficient
sufficient
understanding
understanding among the community
community to warrant an exemption from
124
punishment. 124

3.

Communitarian
Standards of
of
Communitarian Family Obligations and Laxer Standards
Proportionality

The drafters of the MPC concluded
concluded that a coerced actor may be
be
excused
excused from liability
liability for greater harm caused
caused when attempting
attempting to
125
save a loved one than when trying to save himself.125
This position is
is
grounded
grounded in the fact that "danger to a loved one may have greater
greater
impact on a person of reasonable firmness than a danger
danger to
12 6
himself.
While this might
stronger argument in favor
might be true, the stronger
favor
himself."126
communitarian duties
of this contention seems to be that there are communitarian
stemming from familial relationships
relationships that allow for coerced actors to
inflict more harm than would be allowed
allowed absent
absent such a
relationship. 1 27 Once again, this can be more clearly grasped
grasped in cases
relationship.127
involving a parent-child relationship.
While people have an
obligation to do everything in their power to keep their children
obligation
children free
from harm, they do not have a similar obligation
obligation to keep themselves
themselves
128
out of harm's way.
way.128
As a result of this, it seems reasonable
reasonable to allow
allow
a coerced actor to inflict more harm when the lives of his children are
at stake
stake than when
when his own life is threatened.
threatened.

122.
Id.
See, e.g.,
e.g., Robin West, Rights, Capabilities,
Capabilities, and
and the Good Society, 69
123.
FORDHAM L. REV. 1901, 1912 (2001) (arguing that "a state obligation to provide for
FORDHAM
for
of
minimal capabilities requisite to a fully human
human life" requires
requires "some degree of
communal solidarity among citizens" and an "obligation toward ...
... co-citizens").
co-citizens").
Cf.
124.
Cf DUBBER, supra
supra note 12, at 254 ("Even in extreme emergencies,
emergencies, facing
almost certain death, the Code thus allows a defense only if the actor balanced the
potential
potential harms of action and inaction, to herself and others, and then chooses the less
less
harmful course of action (or inaction).").
MODEL PENAL
PENAL CODE § 2.09 (1962).
(1962).
125.
COMMENTARIES § 2.09 cmt. 3 (1985).
MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES
126.
127.
supra note 119, at 699 (noting the strength of the duties of
127.
See Schmidtz, supra
parents toward their own children).
Id.
128.
Id.
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In
In these
these cases
cases the coerced
coerced actor's
actor's decision
decision to harm
harm a third
third party
in
in order
order to save
save his child
child is understandable
understandable both
both because
because of the
difficult
difficult nature
nature of the choice
choice and
and because
because saving the
the child's
child's life fulfills
fulfills
the parent's
parent's communitarian
communitarian duty to protect
protect his family. In
In contrast,
contrast,
when
when aa coerced
coerced defendant
defendant chooses
chooses to
to harm
harm an
an innocent
innocent person
person merely
merely
safeguard her personal
personal interests, the
the understandability
understandability of the
to safeguard
satisfied her
decision
decision will
will not be bolstered
bolstered by a finding
finding that the
the actor satisfied
her
family obligations
obligations by choosing
choosing to harm
harm the third party. This
This should
should
lead to a modification
modification of the
the standard
standard of proportionality
proportionality that typically
typically
conditions the availability
availability of the duress defense:
defense: more
more
averted
between the harm
harm caused
caused and the harm
harm averted
disproportionality between
disproportionality
coercion in order
allowed in cases
cases in which an actor
actor yields to coercion
order to
to
will be allowed
save her loved
loved ones
ones than in
in cases
cases that
that do
do not involve such interests.
interests.
save
4.

Understandability
Understandability and the Capacity
Capacity to Prevent
Prevent the
the Harm
Harm
Threatened
Threatened from
from Occurring
Occurring

Another important
important consideration
consideration to take into account
account when
when
Another
deciding
deciding whether to exempt
exempt a coerced
coerced actor
actor from penal liability
liability is
is
to
could have
have avoided
avoided harming
harming his victims by choosing
choosing to
whether he could
resist the
the threats. This
This factor appeared
appeared to be determinative
determinative for Judge
Cassese
Cassese in Erdemovic;
Erdemovic; in his dissenting opinion, he argued
argued that
that a
coerced
human beings should be relieved of
of
coerced actor who kills innocent human
criminal responsibility if "it is highly probable, if not certain, that if
if
the person acting under duress had
had refused
refused to commit
commit the crime,
crime, the
been carried
carried out by persons
persons other than
crime would in any event have been
'12 9
accused."129
the accused.
Judge
Judge Cassese's
Cassese's position assumes that, in these instances,
instances,
deciding
deciding to kill the innocent
innocent people
people constitutes the lesser evil because
because
"the evil threatened
threatened (the menace to [the life of the coerced actor]
actor] and
his subsequent death) would be greater
greater than the remedy (his
refraining
refraining from committing
committing the crime, i.e., from participating
participating in the
' 130 Therefore, he suggests that this type of case invites a
execution)."130
suggests
execution).
variation of the justification
justification commonly known as the "choice
"choice of evils"
131
defense. 13l
An example in Judge
Judge Cassese's dissent illustrates this lesser evil
132
132
that "a driver of a van..,
Suppose
argument.
van ... transporting
transporting victims
victims
shoot
executioners
told
by
the
. . .is
to a place of execution ...
is
executioners he must shoot

IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting
Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-A,
129.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic,
(Oct. 7, 1997).
Opinion of Judge Cassese, ~ 44 (Oct.
Id.
130.
Id.
(1962) (providing a description of the
Id.; see MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1962)
131.
131.
Id.;
"choice of
evils" defense).
"choice
of evils"
Separate and Dissenting
IT-96-22-A, Separate
Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-A,
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic,
Dissenting
132.
132.
Opinion of Judge Cassese, ~ 47 (Oct. 7, 1997).
HeinOnline -- 41 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 768 2008

2008]
20081

DURESS,
DURESS, DEMANDING HEROISM,
HEROISM, AND
AND PROPORTIONALITY
PROPORTIONALITY

769

'133
the victims
victims or
or he himself
himself will
will be shot.
shot."133
Assuming that
that "[t]he
"[t]he
Assuming
one of the
victims who are
are at
at the execution
execution site
site will
will certainly
certainly die
die in
in any
victims
134
event,"134
shooting the
the innocent
innocent victim
victim would
would constitute
constitute the
the lesser
lesser
event,"
shooting
evil because:

(1) If
If the driver
driver resists
resists the threats, he
he will be
be killed. Shortly
Shortly
(1)
thereafter, the innocent
innocent person
person that
that he was
was ordered
ordered to kill
kill will
will
people will
will die if the
the driver resists the
die anyway. Thus, two people
threat;
threat;

If the driver yields to the threat, his life will be
be spared, but an
an
(2) If
innocent
innocent victim will die. Thus, one person
person will die if he
capitulates
capitulates to the threat.
(3) Two people
people will die if the driver
driver resists
resists the threats, and
and one will
(3)
die if
if he gives
gives way
way to the coercion. Therefore,
Therefore, the
the decision
decision to
to
succumb
succumb to the
the threat and kill the innocent
innocent victim would
would
constitute
constitute the lesser evil.

Based on this logic, Judge Cassese
Cassese concludes
concludes that, even though "the
"the
crime committed
committed under duress
duress must be, on balance,
balance, the lesser of two
evils,"'1 35 someone
evils,"135
someone who is coerced
coerced into "participating in the killing
of...
of
... civilians who would be killed
killed in any case by the other[sl" has a
13 6
13G
defense.
duress
valid
valid
Judge
Judge Cassese's
Cassese's contention
contention is objectionable
objectionable because
because itit
lesser
constitutes the lesser
presupposes an oversimplified
oversimplified calculus
calculus of
of what constitutes
that
would
the
number
of
people
evil. In addition to comparing
comparing
that would have
threats
with the
actor
resisted
the
killed
had
the
coerced
been
been
coerced
to
yielded
amount of people that would have been killed had the actor
actor yielded to
giving
that,
by
the coercion, one should also take into consideration
consideration
commission
someone else in the commission
way to the threats, the actor
actor is aiding someone
in
the
perpetration
and
heinous
act.
This
collaboration
of a wrongful
wrongful
heinous
collaboration
perpetration
itself, an evil that should weigh
of a crime is, in and of itself,
weigh against
against
yielding to the threats. Thus, as the philosopher
philosopher Frances Kamm has
of
suggested, these types of decisions are "not merely a matter
matter of
weighing the lives saved versus the life lost," for the agent's moral
integrity
compromised by his forced involvement
integrity is compromised
involvement in the production
production
13 7
of evil. l37
Similarly, Professor Robinson has stated that "the harm to the
inherent in unjustified aggression" should be taken into
social order inherent

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
172 (1999).

Id.
[d.
Id.
[d.
Id. ~I 16(iii).
[d.
Id. ~ 50(iii).
[d.
& PUB. AFF. 169,
169,
and Collaboration,
Collaboration, 28 PHIL. &
Responsibility and
F.M. Kamm, Responsibility
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138
continental legal
evils. 13S
account when balancing
balancing evils.
Scholars in continental
collaboration
traditions
traditions also argue that the evil inherent in human collaboration
consideration in deciding which
with wrongful conduct
conduct is a relevant consideration
which
evil. 139 One Spanish criminal law
conduct
conduct constitutes the lesser evil,139
balancing evils one must keep in
scholar has asserted that when balancing
III
mind that

[t]he law compares "evils", not "personal interests". [This is crucial],
crucial],
since the gravity
gravity of an "evil" is not only determined by the value of the
"personal
harmed, but
"personal interest"
interest" harmed,
but by
by the
the way
way in
in which
which it is harmed as
Since
well.
Since a harm produced by nature does not allow for an
an
assessment
assessment of anything
anything else besides the personal interest harmed, the
gravity
gravity of the "evil" in such a case is equal
equal to the importance
importance of the
injured
injured interest. However,
However, the "evil" caused [by the conduct of another]
entails
entails not only the harming of a personal
personal interest, but, additionally, aa
perturbation
perturbation of the
the social
social order
order...... .. Thus,
Thus, [a valid lesser evils defense
requires
requires that the personal
personal interest saved] be sufficiently more
compensate for the additional
important
important [than the one harmed]
harmed] to compensate
140
entails].
order entails].140
social order
the social
[harm] that the [perturbation
[perturbation of the
it may not be true, as Judge Cassese suggests, that
Therefore, it
"x" people is necessarily
killing "x"
necessarily a lesser evil than killing "x + 1"
I"
1411 When engaging
people. 14
engaging in this delicate balancing of interests, one
must take into account not only
only the lives at stake but also the evil
of
represents. 14 2 Thus, in the case
that the coerced
coerced actor's aggression represents,142
case of
a coerced actor who saves her own life by killing many people who
of
would have died soon anyway, one must weigh not only the number
number of
lives sacrificed
sacrificed and saved
saved but also the evil inherent
inherent in the actor's
collaboration
conduct of the coercer.
It is
collaboration with the wrongful conduct
nevertheless
nevertheless unclear whether
whether this additional
additional consideration
consideration tilts the
conduct
balance decisively against justifying
justifying the coerced
coerced actor's conduct
constituted as the lesser of two evils.
constituted
Fortunately, there is no need to engage
engage in this delicate balancing
balancing
soon
coerced actor's victims would have died soon
act. The fact that the coerced
conduct
anyway
anyway is relevant to determining whether
whether the actor's conduct
an
understanding among the public to warrant an
generates
generates sufficient
sufficient understanding
not
Although this fact is not
exemption from criminal
exemption
criminal liability.
Although
necessarily
determinative when examining whether the actor's
necessarily determinative
when
conduct is justified
justified as a choice
choice of the lesser evil, it is decisive
decisive when
evaluating
evaluating whether
whether her action should be excused because
because of the
coercion.
coerCIOn.

Causing the Conditions
Conditions of One's Own Defense: A Study in
138.
138. Paul Robinson, Causing
the Limits of Theory in
in Criminal
Criminal Law Doctrine,
Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REV. 1, 3 n.4 (1985).
MIR PUIG, DERECHO
139.
See, e.g.,
e.g., SANTIAGO Mrn
DERECHO PENAL PARTE GENERAL (7th ed.
2004).
2004).

Id. at 463-64.
140.
140.
Erdemovi6, Case
141.
141. Prosecutor
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic,
Case No. IT-96-22-A,
IT·96·22·A, Separate and Dissenting
Opinion
Opinion of Judge Cassese, ~T 47 (Oct. 7, 1997).
142.
See Kamm, supra
142.
supra note 137, at 172
172 (noting that factors other than the
number oflives
of lives saved or lost must be taken
taken into account).
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Thus, although a coerced
coerced actor who harms an innocent victim
may act wrongfully despite
despite the fact that she could not have prevented
prevented3
14
conduct. 143
her conduct.
excuse her
to excuse
the harm, this fact provides
provides a sound reason to
There is no need to inquire whether
whether the harm caused
caused was
was
determine whether to
proportional to the harm
proportional
harm averted
averted in order
order to determine
to
effectively lacked the
excuse the coerced
coerced actor. Because
Because the actor effectively
capacity to prevent
prevent the harm threatened
threatened from occurring, punishing
the actor for deciding to save
save her own life instead of dying to protect
protect
innocent people who were going to die anyway would be unfair. In
In
case is wrongful but
sum, yielding to the coercive threats in this case
perfectly understandable
understandable and, hence, not punishable.
perfectly
V.
v.

UNDERSTANDABLE CHOICE
THEORY TO THE
APPLYING THE UNDERSTANDABLE
CHOICE THEORY
THE
ERDEMOVIC CASE
CASE

Analyzing
Analyzing the Erdemovic case in light of the understandable
understandable
choice
choice theory
theory of duress
duress is no easy task. As this Article
Article has
demonstrated
defendant faced an
demonstrated in the preceding
preceding Parts, whether
whether the defendant
an
unfairly hard
choice-making capabilities
hard choice
choice and whether
whether his choice-making
capabilities were
reduced
coercive situation are relevant factors, but neither is
reduced by the coercive
144
duress. 144
of duress.
choice theory
decisive
decisive according
according to the understandable
understandable choice
theory of
overcome
While actors
actors who face unfairly hard choices or whose will is overcome
sufficient understanding
by threats generally find sufficient
understanding among the
community
community to warrant
warrant an exception from
liability, in some cases they
145
will nevertheless
nevertheless be held
held responsible.
responsible. 145
Coerced actors will typically
typically be punished
punished for yielding to threats
that presented
presented them with unfairly hard choices if they had a duty not
not
146
to capitulate
capitulate to such coercion. 146
These duties can be voluntarily
47 However,
assumed, as in the case of firefighters and police officers.t
officers. 147
they can also be involuntarily imposed, as in the case of obligations
obligations
48 Furthermore, people
arising out of familial relationships.t
relationships. 148
people have
have a
general
obligation based on their relationships
general obligation
relationships with fellow citizens
citizens to
resist threats to which yielding
yielding would produce harm that is grossly
149
averted. 149
harm averted.
the harm
disproportionate
disproportionate to the
Several of these principles suggest
suggest that the ICTY was correct to
conclude that Erdemovic should not have been
conclude
been able to claim duress
duress as

Professor
143.
Professor Kent Greenawalt,
Greenawalt, for example, has stated that the argument
argument that
that
coerced conduct
conduct that causes
causes harm
harm to an innocent human being should
should be excused but
but
not justified "has some
supra note 49, at 25.
some power." Greenawalt,
Greenawalt, supra
See supra
supra Part IV.A.
144.
145.
See supra
supraPart IV.B.
See supra
supraPart IV.C.
146.
See supra
supra Part IV.C.l.
IV.C.1.
147.
See supra
supraPart
148.
Part IV.C.2.
See supra
supra Part
149.
Part IV.C.3.
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a defense
defense to the killing of dozens of civilians. Chief among the
relevant considerations
considerations is that, as a soldier, Erdemovic had an
an
150
In the standard
obligation to protect
protect innocent
innocent noncombatants. 150
case, a soldier is required to resist threats to his own life and bodily
151
While the law should
integrity in order to protect
protect innocent people. 15l
not generally demand
demand that most people resist threats to their lives in
perfectly legitimate
order to avoid harm to third parties, it is perfectly
legitimate to
require such a degree of courage from people
people who, like soldiers, have
assumed certain duties towards
towards to the general populace.
The seriousness
seriousness of the offense thesis also supports convicting
defense to a single
Erdemovic. Even though claiming duress as a defense
murder is not particularly
particularly problematic,
problematic, allowing it as a defense
defense to a
crime involving the killing of dozens of people is more complicated.
While it is not difficult
difficult to see how a coerced
coerced actor who kills one
innocent person in order to avoid death can generate
generate sufficient
sufficient
understanding from the community to be exempted from punishment,
can
it is more doubtful that someone
someone who kills a number of people can
comprehension from the public.
expect the same degree
degree of comprehension
These factors are trumped, however, by the fact that Erdemovic
capacity to prevent the deaths of the innocent
innocent
did not have the capacity
resistance on
on
civilians that he killed in order to save his life. 152 Any resistance
his part would ultimately have been
been futile, because
because the civilians
civilians
153 As a result of these
would have died at the hands of other soldiers. 153
considerations, punishing Erdemovic for not symbolically
symbolically resisting
the coercion is unnecessarily
unnecessarily harsh.
However,
However, contrary to Judge Cassese's
Cassese's argument in his dissenting
opinion, 154 this reasoning
opinion,154
reasoning does not make
make Erdemovic's decision to kill
the innocent civilians any less wrongful. The conclusion
conclusion that the
defendant chose the lesser evil when he participated
participated in the execution
defendant
execution
of nearly seventy
seventy innocent people is dubious at the very least.
Nevertheless, had the justices considered the fact that Erdemovic
capitulate to the
victims by refusing to capitulate
could not have saved his victims
threats, they should have found that fact a compelling and sufficient
sufficient
reason to excuse his wrongful conduct.

See Prosecutor
IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion
150.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6,
Erdemovic, Case
Case No. IT·96-22-A,
of Judge McDonald and Judge
Judge Vohrah, ~ 84 (Oct. 7, 1997) (noting the "view that
combatants are expected to exercise
soldiers or combatants
exercise fortitude and a greater
greater degree of
of
resistance to a threat than
than civilians").
Id.
151.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic,
Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-A,
152.
See Prosecutor
IT-96-22-A, Judgment
Judgment on Appeal,
been
~ 4 (Oct. 7,
7, 1997) (containing defendant's
defendant's testimony that he himself
himself would have been
killed had he not shot the victims
victims in question).
153.
Id.
Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-A,
IT-96-22-A, Separate
154.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic,
Separate and Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Cassese, ~ 50 (Oct. 7, 1997).
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VI. CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

Erdemovic case
A majority
majority of the justices
justices in the Erdemovic
case believed that
that
duress should not be a defense
defense to a crime against humanity. They
justified their decision by appealing
appealing to the common
common law rule that
that
disallows the defense
defense whenever
whenever a defendant
defendant is charged with a crime
involving
involving the killing of innocent human beings. This rule is based on
on
the idea that killing an innocent
innocent human
human being
being should never be
considered
considered the lesser of two evils.
As this Article
Article has argued, the justices' application
application of the
common
common law rule is unsound. Properly understood, duress is an
an
excuse. Therefore, actors who commit crimes under duress are
acquitted
acquitted out of compassion
compassion for their circumstances.
circumstances. Their conduct,
however, remains
is
remains wrongful. Hence, when a coerced defendant
defendant is
circumstances surrounding
surrounding his
excused it is because, in light of the circumstances
action, his choice
understandable-not
choice to engage in wrongdoing is understandable-not
because
because he chose the lesser evil. Consequently, a rule allowing an
an
actor to plead duress only when his conduct averted a greater
greater evil
evil
improperly
improperly conditions
conditions the availability
availability of the excuse on the existence
existence
of justificatory circumstances-circumstances
circumstances-circumstances that make
make the act
act
performed,
performed, on balance, the right thing to do under the circumstances.
Therefore,
Therefore, the legal community
community should reject the common law rule
that duress
duress is not a defense
defense to murder because the killing of an
an
innocent
considered the right thing to
innocent human
human being cannot
cannot ever be considered
do.
actor
The situation is different, however, when the coerced actor
pleads
of
pleads duress
duress as a defense to a crime involving the killing of
numerous
numerous human
human beings. As the seriousness
seriousness of the offense increases,
the arguments in favor of allowing the defendant
defendant to plead duress get
get
progressively
in
progressively weaker. Thus, the fact that the coerced defendant
defendant in
Erdemovic
Erdemovic killed dozens of people suggests that he should not be
be
allowed
Another
allowed to plead duress as a defense to the crime
crime charged. Another
sound
sound reason to deny his duress claim is that soldiers
soldiers have
have a duty not
not
to kill innocent civilians, even if refusing to kill civilians
civilians requires
requires the
soldiers
soldiers to ignore
ignore threats to their lives.
above-mentioned considerations,
Ultimately, despite the above-mentioned
considerations,
Erdemovic
Erdemovic should have
have prevailed
prevailed on a plea of duress. Because
Because he
could not have prevented
prevented the deaths of his victims even if he had
had
resisted coercion, it is unfair
unfair to punish him for choosing to yield to the
coercion in order to save
coercion
save his own life. Hence, although the fact that
that
not
he lacked
lacked the capacity
capacity to prevent
prevent the death of the civilians
civilians should not
considered a sufficient
it offers
be considered
sufficient reason to justify his conduct, it
offers
compelling grounds for excusing
excusing his admittedly
admittedly wrongful
wrongful act.
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